United States v. Smith, 945 F.3d 729

Background

Sammy Smith was arrested after CBP found multiple Glock and other handgun parts in his checked luggage at JFK Airport on two separate international travel attempts; parts were seized and he was indicted for attempted export without a license under the AECA/ITAR.
The Indictment charged attempted export of tangible firearm components listed on the USML (Category I(g),(h)); Smith pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss.
Smith argued the AECA and ITAR are facially overbroad under the First Amendment because the regulations define and bar the export (and “deemed export”) of broad categories of “technical data,” which he says restricts protected speech.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss; sentenced Smith to 2 months’ imprisonment (below Guidelines); he appealed claiming overbreadth and related First Amendment defects.
The Second Circuit held the challenged regulations were constitutional as applied to Smith and, critically, concluded Smith lacked Article III standing to bring a facial overbreadth challenge to the ITAR definitions of “technical data” and “deemed export,” because his conviction stemmed from exporting tangible parts, not technical data.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Facial overbreadth re: definition of “technical data” and “deemed export”	ITAR’s broad definitions sweep in protected speech (information), making the scheme substantially overbroad	Smith’s conviction arises from tangible firearm parts, not technical data; overbreadth challenge targets unrelated provisions	Smith lacks Article III standing; overbreadth claim dismissed for lack of traceability/redressability
As-applied First Amendment challenge	AECA/ITAR restrict speech and impose content-based limits	Smith’s conduct (transporting physical gun parts) is non‑speech and non‑expressive conduct	Statute/regulations constitutional as applied; challenged provisions relevant to his conviction do not implicate First Amendment
Prior restraint/content‑based challenge	Licensing regime functions as prior restraint and content-based restriction on expression	Standing fails because challenged provisions do not underlie Smith’s conviction; merits not reached	Court did not reach merits; standing analysis bars these facial First Amendment claims
Severability/redressability (if overbreadth provisions invalidated)	Challenged portions are inseverable; invalidation would nullify Smith’s conviction	Presumption of severability; invalidating definitions of technical data would not disrupt provisions criminalizing tangible exports	Severability presumed; vacating only the technical‑data language would not redress Smith, so standing/relief denied

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (overbreadth doctrine limits)
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (distinguishing conduct from protected expression)
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (standing — injury‑in‑fact requirements)
Sec’y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (prudential standing and third‑party rights)
Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (presumption of severability)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (severability principles)
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (preserving right to appeal constitutional challenge after guilty plea)
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006) (overbreadth as exception to third‑party standing rule)
Dhinsa v. Krueger, 917 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2019) (standing elements summarized)
United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) (upholding AECA/ITAR against similar challenges)