United States v. Simpson
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 459
10th Cir.2017Background
- Police obtained a search warrant based on a confidential informant and executed it at Simpson’s home; they found ~20 g cocaine, firearms, and ammunition. Simpson was tried and convicted on 13 counts; district court imposed concurrent terms (240 months on drug count; 120 months others).
- At the morning of trial Simpson filed a written motion to proceed pro se and orally requested a continuance; he told the court he was not prepared to represent himself that day. The district court denied both motions.
- Simpson sought discovery of pole-camera footage stored on a hard drive the government says crashed; the district court denied Simpson’s request to inspect the drive.
- The jury was instructed on “constructive possession” without a separate “intent-to-exercise-dominion” element; that instructional standard changed on appeal after controlling Tenth Circuit precedent adopted an intent element.
- At sentencing the court applied a two-level §3C1.2 enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight based on Simpson’s ramming his car into a SWAT vehicle during arrest.
Issues
| Issue | Simpson’s Argument | Government’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Right to self-representation (Faretta) | Simpson says he clearly and timely invoked his Faretta right and the court abused its discretion by denying it. | Court viewed his pro se request as conditional on a continuance and untimely/delaying; denial proper. | Affirmed: request was not clearly and unequivocally for pro se representation absent a continuance and court could treat it as untimely delay. |
| Denial of continuance | Simpson contends denial prevented meaningful self-representation. | Court and government argue prior last-minute continuance had been granted and a second would unduly disrupt court and witnesses. | Affirmed: denial not an abuse of discretion under Rivera factors. |
| Denial of inspection of pole-camera hard drive (Rule 16 / Brady / Youngblood) | Simpson argues the drive might contain exculpatory footage to suppress the warrant or impeach the informant/witness; government’s failure to preserve or disclose violated Brady/Youngblood and Rule 16. | Government says footage unrecoverable (drive crashed); Simpson failed to make prima facie materiality showing and any Brady/Youngblood error is not plain. | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion on Rule 16; plain-error review fails for Brady/Youngblood because no obvious suppression or bad faith and no proof footage would be favorable. |
| Jury instruction on constructive possession (omitted intent element) | Instruction omitted required intent-to-exercise-dominion element (per later Tenth Circuit law), prejudicing Simpson on multiple firearm/ammunition counts. | Government concedes error but argues any error was harmless on some counts due to uncontroverted evidence of intent. | Mixed: Affirmed as to Count 1 (drug distribution) and Counts 2 & 5 (shotgun/unregistered) because evidence of intent was sufficient; reversed as to Counts 3–4 and 7–14 and remanded for new trial due to plain error. |
| Sentencing §3C1.2 enhancement (reckless endangerment) | Simpson says he was startled, intoxicated, acted instinctively and didn’t know intruders were police. | Court found Simpson knew police surrounded him and acted recklessly by ramming vehicle. | Affirmed: district court’s factual finding not clearly erroneous; enhancement upheld for Counts 1, 2, and 5. |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to self-representation)
- United States v. Tucker, 451 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2006) (motion for self-representation is timely if made before jury impanelment unless it is a tactic to secure delay)
- United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2005) (deference to district court findings on pro se requests and timeliness)
- United States v. Little, 829 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2016) (constructive-possession requires an intent element following Henderson)
- Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780 (2015) (affirming that constructive-possession includes intent-to-exercise-dominion element)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable material evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (due process violation requires bad-faith destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence)
- Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338 (2016) (plain-error standard and its elements)