933 F.3d 95
2d Cir.2019Background
- Defendants (Lopez, Beltran, Lopez-Cabrera) were members of the Bronx Trinitarios gang and convicted of racketeering-related murders under 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (murder in aid of racketeering).
- Convictions included killings committed between 2009–2010: several murders (Casul, Avila-Gomez, Tavares, Cruz, Polanco) with varying roles among defendants (driver/participant/shooter/cover-up conduct).
- Each defendant was aged 18–22 at the time of the offenses; the district court imposed mandatory life terms (federal life without parole) as mandatory minimums under § 1959.
- Defendants moved below, and argued on appeal, that mandatory life sentences are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment given their ages (relying on Miller) and, as to Lopez, that his lesser/ Pinkerton role makes life mandatory sentencing unconstitutional (relying on Enmund).
- The district court denied relief; the Second Circuit affirmed, holding Miller’s protections stop at age 18 and that Supreme Court precedent forecloses Lopez’s Enmund/mandatory-sentence-based challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Age-based Eighth Amendment challenge to mandatory life for those 18–22 | Mandatory life is cruel and unusual for young adults because developmental science extends juvenile mitigating traits into early 20s (extend Miller) | Mandatory life is constitutional for adults; Miller and related precedents draw the line at 18 | Rejected — Miller draws the constitutional line at 18; age-based challenge fails |
| Lopez: mandatory life for Pinkerton/aiders and abettors (lesser role) | Life without parole is unconstitutional for an aider/abettor who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill (analogy to Enmund) | Harmelin and Supreme Court precedent permit severe non-capital sentences and foreclose extending Enmund/Miller to bar mandatory life for non-killers | Rejected — Supreme Court precedent (Harmelin, Miller not overruling Harmelin) forecloses extending Enmund or treating mandatory noncapital life as per se unconstitutional |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for those under 18 violates the Eighth Amendment because sentencing authorities must consider mitigating youth-related factors)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (capital punishment for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; draws line at 18)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (life without parole for juveniles committing non-homicide offenses violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (rejects the view that mandatory sentences are per se cruel and unusual and distinguishes capital punishment as "different")
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty unconstitutional for aider/abettor who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill)
- Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (a conspirator may be held liable for crimes committed by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy)
- United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2013) (under Miller, courts cannot substitute relative immaturity for actual minority age)