United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388

Background

Francesk Shkambi, incarcerated at FCI Elkton, contracted COVID-19 and later requested compassionate release citing fear of reinfection and immune suppression from prednisone.
Shkambi fully exhausted administrative remedies after the warden denied his BOP request and then filed a defendant-initiated motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (First Step Act).
The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because Shkambi’s motion was not tethered to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13) and dismissed the motion.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed whether § 3582’s limits are jurisdictional and whether § 1B1.13 binds courts considering defendant-filed motions after the FSA amendment.
The Fifth Circuit held the district court had jurisdiction, and that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (and its commentary) does not bind courts addressing prisoner-filed motions under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); the case was reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 3582(c)(1)(A)'s limits are jurisdictional	United States: §3582's procedural limits circumscribe jurisdiction; courts must dismiss when limits not met	Shkambi: §3582 motions are post-judgment motions filed in same docket and are adjudicated on the merits, not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction	Held: Limits are non-jurisdictional; district court had jurisdiction and should have adjudicated merits rather than dismissing.
Whether U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 binds courts addressing defendant-filed § 3582 motions	United States: §1B1.13’s definition of "extraordinary and compelling" governs consistency requirement for all §3582 motions	Shkambi: §1B1.13 explicitly applies only to BOP-filed motions and thus does not bind defendant-filed motions	Held: §1B1.13 and its commentary apply only to motions by the Director of the BOP and do not bind courts considering defendant-filed motions.
Whether courts may rely on portions of §1B1.13 (e.g., application note 1) for defendant-filed motions	United States: Court may consult §1B1.13’s examples and commentary when assessing "extraordinary and compelling" reasons	Shkambi: Can't transplant parts of a BOP-specific policy statement divorced from its context	Held: Courts cannot selectively rely on inapplicable BOP-specific policy text; context matters—§1B1.13 is not binding for defendant motions.
Remedy and standard on remand	United States: (implicit) apply §3582(c)(1)(A)(i), §3553(a), and consult Commission guidance if appropriate	Shkambi: Courts should apply the statutory text (§3582 and §3553(a)) and exercise discretion without being bound by §1B1.13	Held: On remand, district court must consider defendant's motion under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and §3553(a); free to determine what counts as "extraordinary and compelling" absent a binding Commission policy for defendant-filed motions.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (explains §1B1.13 applies to BOP-filed motions and is not dispositive for defendant-filed motions)
United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (refuses to read §1B1.13 as binding on defendant-filed First Step Act motions)
United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (holds sentencing commission policy statement not binding for defendant-initiated motions)
United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (interprets compassionate-release framework post-FSA and limits of §1B1.13)
United States v. Lightfoot, 724 F.3d 593 (5th Cir. 2013) (discusses pre-FSA compassionate-release framework and §3553(a) considerations)
United States v. Graves, 908 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 2018) (reminds that textual provisions must be read in context)
Shrimpers & Fishermen of RGV v. Tex. Comm’n on Env’t Quality, 968 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2020) (articulates principle that Article III jurisdiction is considered first)
Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843 (2019) (clarifies distinction between jurisdictional limits and procedural or substantive limits)