United States v. Shiu Lung Leung
796 F.3d 1032
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Leung, an AU Optronics executive, was retried and convicted on Sherman Act price‑fixing charges after a hung jury at his first trial.
- After conviction and before sentencing, Leung filed a motion for a new trial supported solely by a juror affidavit alleging that several jurors discussed the evidence during trial breaks and that at least three had decided guilt before formal deliberations.
- The district court denied a new trial and an evidentiary hearing, ruling the affidavit inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b); Leung was sentenced to 24 months.
- Leung argued the affidavit showed juror dishonesty and bias during voir dire (entitling him to inquiry), and that the motion was timely because the court had effectively granted an extension.
- The government contended the motion was untimely and that the affidavit was barred by Rule 606(b).
- The Ninth Circuit accepted that the motion was timely (Rule 33 is nonjurisdictional and the district court granted an extension) but affirmed denial on the merits because Rule 606(b) barred the juror testimony.
Issues
| Issue | Leung's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of new‑trial motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2) | Motion was timely because the district court effectively allowed a filing extension | Motion was time‑barred (filed ~4 months after verdict) | Motion was timely; district court granted an open‑ended extension and considered the motion |
| Admissibility of post‑verdict juror affidavit alleging pre‑deliberation discussions (Rule 606(b)) | Affidavit is admissible because discussions occurred before formal deliberations and instead show juror bias/dishonesty during voir dire | Affidavit is barred by Rule 606(b) as inquiry into the jury’s internal processes and mental states | Barred: juror testimony about premature deliberations or having decided guilt before deliberations is inadmissible to impeach the verdict under Rule 606(b) |
| Whether pre‑deliberation statements can be used to prove voir‑dire deceit (McDonough claim) | Affidavit implies jurors lied during voir dire about refraining from discussing the case, so McDonough challenge should be allowed | Even if discussions occurred pre‑deliberation, the affidavit contains no evidence of deceit or bias; Rule 606(b) prevents parsing jurors’ mental processes post‑verdict | Rejected: affidavit lacks proof of deceit; permitting such testimony would eviscerate finality and improperly probe jurors’ mental processes |
| Availability of alternative remedies for juror misconduct discovered post‑verdict | (implied) Post‑verdict juror affidavit is sufficient to require relief | Relief should rely on admissible non‑juror evidence or on in‑trial reporting; juror testimony post‑verdict is generally barred | Post‑verdict juror affidavit is too late; other remedies (in‑trial disclosures, non‑juror evidence) are the proper routes |
Key Cases Cited
- Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (prohibits juror testimony to impeach verdict about internal deliberations and mental processes)
- Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (Rule 606(b) bars juror testimony about bias discovered during deliberations; exceptions limited)
- Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (Rule 33’s 14‑day deadline is nonjurisdictional and subject to extension)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (presenting a valid challenge for cause requires proof a juror failed to answer voir dire honestly about a material matter)
- Hard v. Burlington Northern R.R., 812 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. decision abrogated by Warger regarding post‑deliberation juror bias testimony)
- United States v. Davis, 960 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. precedent describing similar juror‑statement‑based new‑trial claims as meritless)
- United States v. Hsiung, 778 F.3d 738 (controls appellate treatment of related Sherman Act challenges)