United States v. Sheryl Lagrone, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 23294

Lagrone was convicted on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641 for stealing $880 of stamps from two post offices.
Each theft involved property under $1,000, but the two thefts together exceeded $1,000 in aggregate.
The district court sentenced 45 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, with restitution and special assessments.
Lagrone argued only one felony could be charged under § 641 because the first theft did not reach $1,000 on its own and the lenity provision should apply.
The government argued multiple felonies were proper because aggregation across counts could push the total above $1,000, imposing a felony penalty on each count.
The panel affirmed the district court’s sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 641 permits a felony penalty for the first theft when aggregate thefts exceed $1,000	Lagrone asserts the first theft cannot retroactively be a felony	Lagrone contends lenity applies per count if individual thefts fall below $1,000	Yes, the first theft may be a felony when aggregation exceeds $1,000
Whether § 641 allows aggregation of multiple counts to impose felony penalties for each count	Lagrone challenges multiplicity under aggregation	Government maintains each count may be a felony if total exceeds $1,000	Yes, aggregation permits felony penalties on each count when total exceeds $1,000
Double jeopardy and Apprendi-related concerns about cumulative penalties under § 641	Apprendi/double jeopardy would bar cumulative penalties	Congress intended felony penalties for each count if aggregation exceeds $1,000	No fatal double-jeopardy issue; statutory intent supports cumulative felony penalties

United States v. Reagan, 596 F.3d 251 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that unit of prosecution under § 641 is each transaction when above $1,000 in aggregate not required for count-by-count felony)
United States v. Taylor, 869 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1989) (lenity provision depends on aggregate value; above $500 aggregate allows maximum penalty; distinction from § 641 context)
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (Supreme Court 1983? (1996 in text)) (double jeopardy limits on cumulative sentences, not legislature’s intent to authorize multiple felonies)
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (constitutional avoidance when statute admits two constructions to avoid serious questions)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be tried to a jury)
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003) (discussion on Apprendi principles and applicability to sentencing)