42 F.4th 388
4th Cir.2022Background
- Petties was indicted on three counts under 18 U.S.C. § 2250: Count One (failure to register, § 2250(a)) and Counts Two and Three (commission of a crime of violence while failing to register, § 2250(d), each alleging a § 1201 kidnapping predicate).
- Petties entered a conditional guilty plea to Count Two (§ 2250(d)) reserving the right to appeal whether § 1201 kidnapping is a “crime of violence.” In exchange the government agreed to dismiss Counts One and Three and to “not further prosecute” conduct underlying the indictment.
- The Fourth Circuit accepted the government’s concession (in light of Dimaya and Davis) that § 1201 kidnapping is not a crime of violence, vacated Petties’s conviction on Count Two, and remanded.
- On remand the government sought to prosecute Petties on the previously dismissed failure-to-register charge (Count One); the district court allowed reinstatement and convicted Petties (after a bench trial where he presented no defense).
- Petties appealed, arguing the plea agreement barred reprosecution of the dismissed counts and that he had not repudiated the agreement; the government defended reinstatement and argued the agreement was discharged or that § 3296 authorized revival of Count One.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence and ordered Petties’ release, holding the plea agreement barred prosecution on the dismissed charge and that Petties had not repudiated the agreement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Petties) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the plea agreement permitted reprosecution of dismissed counts after Petties’s Count Two conviction was vacated | The agreement barred further prosecution of conduct charged in the indictment if Petties’s conditional plea succeeded on appeal | The agreement did not bar reprosecution because it lacked an explicit immunity-on-remand clause; vacatur discharged the agreement | Plea agreement barred reprosecution; construed against the government as drafter and it could have reserved the right but did not |
| Whether Petties repudiated the plea agreement by seeking release rather than pleading to a lesser included offense on remand | Petties did not repudiate; he performed his bargain (conditional guilty plea and reserved appeal) | Petties repudiated when he refused to plead to the lesser included §2250(a) offense on remand | No repudiation: agreement did not unambiguously require pleading to any lesser included offense |
| Whether pleading guilty to Count Two necessarily included a promise to plead to its lesser included offense (§2250(a)) if Count Two became invalid | Plea did not include a separate, knowing promise to plead to lesser included offenses | Plea encompassed the lesser included failure-to-register offense and thus Petties should have been required to plead on remand | No incorporation: no textual or colloquy-based evidence that Petties knowingly agreed to plead to lesser included offenses; ambiguity resolved for defendant |
| Whether §3296 authorized reinstatement of the dismissed count after vacatur | §3296 inapplicable here; conviction (not plea) was vacated and vacatur was not solely on defendant's motion | §3296 permits reinstatement; the vacatur was effectively instigated by Petties’ appeal or refusal to plead | Court did not decide §3296’s applicability; because plea agreement barred reprosecution, reinstatement under §3296 could not be used here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wood, 378 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 2004) (de novo review of plea-agreement interpretation)
- United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2019) (plea agreements interpreted under contract principles with heightened scrutiny)
- United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1986) (government held to greater responsibility for ambiguities in plea agreements)
- United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (ambiguities in plea agreements construed against the government)
- United States v. Sandoval-Lopez, 122 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1997) (government barred from reprosecuting charges dismissed under a plea agreement after convictions were vacated)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (invalidated an immigration residual clause as void for vagueness)
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (invalidated a residual clause in § 924(c) as void for vagueness)
- United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375 (4th Cir. 2019) (held §1201 kidnapping is not a crime of violence under §924(c))