537 F.Supp.3d 91
D. Mass.2021Background
- Alfred Trenkler was convicted by a jury in 1993 of conspiracy and explosives offenses for a 1991 Roslindale bombing that killed one bomb-squad officer and maimed another; he has been incarcerated since and is serving life sentences imposed in 1994.
- At trial the government relied on circumstantial evidence (an earlier similar device, database printouts, Trenkler’s statements and a jail-cell confession) but there was no direct physical evidence tying him to the bombmaker role.
- In 2007 the sentencing court (Judge Zobel) vacated the life sentence by coram nobis after discovering that, under the statute in force at the time, only a jury could impose a life sentence; she resentenced Trenkler to 37 years, but the First Circuit reversed in 2008 and reinstated the life terms.
- Trenkler filed a compassionate release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) asserting (1) heightened COVID-19 risk from serious cardiac conditions and an outbreak at USP Tucson, and (2) extraordinary and compelling circumstances arising from the sentencing error, alleged trial unfairness, and sentencing disparity with his co-defendant.
- The court found administrative exhaustion satisfied, concluded COVID-19 risk alone (after first vaccine dose and facility improvement) did not qualify as extraordinary and compelling, but that the unlawful judge-imposed life sentence constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason because it was a legal error for which no other avenue of relief remained.
- Balancing § 3553(a) factors and sentencing precedent, the court reduced Trenkler’s term to 41 years and imposed concurrent supervised-release terms (3 years Count 1, 5 years Counts 2 and 3).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Trenkler) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Administrative exhaustion and authority to file | Trenkler had exhausted BOP remedies and may file directly under the First Step Act | BOP denial was proper; court should apply policy limits | Court found exhaustion satisfied and that district courts may adjudicate inmate-filed motions post-First Step Act |
| COVID-19 + medical risk = extraordinary & compelling? | Severe cardiac disease, age, BMI, smoking history and USP Tucson outbreak justify release | Initially conceded risk but later argued vaccine uptake and facility improvement undercut exigency | Court: risk heightened but because Trenkler accepted first Moderna dose and USP Tucson’s outbreak abated, COVID risk alone did not meet extraordinary-and-compelling standard |
| Sentencing error (judge imposed life vs. jury) qualifies as extraordinary & compelling | The 1994 life sentence was unlawful because only a jury could direct life under §34/§844; coram nobis showed the error and there is no other remedy | First Circuit previously held the coram nobis relief improper under AEDPA and emphasized finality; government urged courts not to relitigate settled appeal | Court: under §3582(c)(1)(A) and First Step Act discretion, the sentencing error is extraordinary and compelling, especially given lack of other remedies; relief permitted |
| Appropriate reduction / §3553(a) factors and extent of relief | Given error, disparities, doubts about evidence, and health, reduction to time served or a much shorter term warranted | Emphasized gravity of offense, victims' harms, and finality; opposed release | Court reduced sentence to 41 years (less than life), explaining that this balances seriousness, deterrence, public safety, defendant’s characteristics, and need to remedy unlawful life sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming conviction; discussing trial evidence)
- Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2008) (reinstating life sentence; coram nobis jurisdictional/ AEDPA analysis)
- United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020) (district courts need not follow U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 for inmate-filed compassionate-release motions)
- United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098 (6th Cir. 2020) (adopting three-part inquiry and permitting district courts to define extraordinary and compelling for inmate-filed motions)
- United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing § 3582(c)(1)(A) as a safety valve to reduce unjust or outdated sentences)
- United States v. Shkambi, 993 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding policy statement and commentary do not bind district courts on inmate-filed motions)
- United States v. Ebbers, 432 F. Supp. 3d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (discussing inapplicability of § 1B1.13 to defendant-filed motions)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (jury-trial rule for facts increasing penalty)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (rendering federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (standards for variances from Guidelines)
- Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (district court discretion regarding Guidelines disparities)