United States v. Shaeed Calhoun
876 F.3d 812
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Four defendants (Pembrook, Calhoun, Briley, Johnson) were prosecuted for two linked jewelry-store robberies in Michigan on April 22, 2014 (Medawar and Tapper’s), convicted by a jury on Hobbs Act robbery, conspiracy, two § 924(c) firearm counts, and felon-in-possession, and sentenced to lengthy terms (32 years consecutive for § 924(c) counts).
- FBI investigation used tower-dump and call-detail records for four prepaid phones that tracked travel from Philadelphia → New Buffalo (hotel) → near Medawar before the first robbery → near Tapper’s before the second robbery → back to Philadelphia; phone-call links tied numbers to Calhoun, Briley, and Johnson.
- Independent evidence: surveillance videos (Comfort Inn, Shell station, both jewelry stores) showing the same vehicles (black Chrysler minivan and white Volkswagen Passat) and overlapping suspects; DNA and ballistic evidence tied Pembrook to Medawar; Passat rental records tied to Calhoun; photos on Briley’s phone matched clothing in surveillance.
- Defendants moved pretrial to suppress photo-array IDs, cell-tower evidence, and to sever after an unexpected jailhouse-informant testified; motions denied; trial proceeded and convictions entered.
- On appeal, defendants raised challenges including suggestive/photo-array identification, suppression and admissibility of cell-site data and related expert/lay testimony, Brady/Giglio claims about informant records, Bruton/Confrontation issues, sufficiency of evidence, duplicative § 924(c) counts, and vagueness of § 924(c)(3)(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Photo‑array suggestiveness / identification admissibility | Govt: photo‑array admissible; testimony credible; admissibility is for court | Briley/Calhoun: photo array unduly suggestive; Graff’s ID unreliable and possibly coached via video; Brady violation for nondisclosure | Court: no clear error in denying suppression; police testimony credited; admissible and for jury weight |
| Suppression of cell‑tower records (Fourth Amendment / SCA §2703) | Govt: obtained records under SCA court orders; objectively reasonable belief warrant not required | Defs: expectation of privacy; needed warrant or suppression; SCA showing insufficient (fishing expedition) | Court: denial affirmed—no established precedent then required a warrant; SCA showing sufficient; suppression unwarranted |
| Admissibility of cell‑site expert/lay testimony (Daubert / FRE 701/702) | Govt: methodology reliable for general location; Hess as expert and Max as lay properly limited | Defs (Pembrook): cell‑site analysis unreliable, required Daubert hearing, lay witness impermissibly gave expert testimony | Court: cell‑site testimony admissible (method reliable for broad location); lay testimony within personal-knowledge bounds; no abuse of discretion |
| Brady / Giglio re: jailhouse informant records | Govt: no federal obligation to produce state prison records not in its possession; informant impeachment not material here | Pembrook: withheld correctional records about informant Jenkins that could impeach him | Court: no Brady/Giglio violation—records not in govt possession/control; defendant failed to show materiality/prejudice |
| Bruton / Confrontation clause (inmate hearsay admissions) | Defs: Jenkins’s testimony about Pembrook’s statements implicated co‑defendants and required severance | Govt: statements nontestimonial; Bruton limited to testimonial confessions | Court: statements nontestimonial; no Bruton violation |
| Sufficiency of evidence for identifications / convictions | Defs: circumstantial proof weak; surveillance and IDs equivocal; alternate phone numbers exist | Govt: combined tower data, rental records, surveillance videos, photos, calls between phones, and Pembrook’s contact support convictions | Court: viewing evidence in government’s favor, a rational juror could convict; sufficiency upheld |
| Duplicitous § 924(c) convictions / double jeopardy | Defs: Counts 2 and 4 both predicated on same gun use (Tapper’s), so duplicative | Govt: separate firearm uses—possession/transport for conspiracy and use at Tapper’s (and Medawar) constitute distinct choices | Court: convictions separate—multiple § 924(c) convictions allowed where distinct firearm uses; no double jeopardy |
| Vagueness of § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) | Defs: § 924(c)(3)(B) vague under Johnson/Dimaya, so sentencing minima invalid | Govt: Sixth Circuit precedent (Taylor) holds clause valid; pending Supreme Court decisions preserved but do not change result now | Court: issue preserved but under existing Sixth Circuit law § 924(c)(3)(B) not void; claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Confrontation Clause limits use of co‑defendant confessions in joint trials)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially exculpatory evidence in its possession)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecution must disclose impeachment deals and promises to witnesses)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (trial court gatekeeping for expert testimony reliability)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Vichitvongsa, 819 F.3d 260 (6th Cir. 2016) (multiple § 924(c) convictions require multiple affirmative firearm acts)
- United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding § 924(c)(3)(B) was not void for vagueness post‑Johnson)
- United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 962 (6th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for suppression of identification evidence)