954 F.3d 74
2d Cir.2020Background
- Gerald Scott pleaded guilty in 2007 to Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm, and being a felon in possession; his § 922(g)(1) sentence was enhanced under ACCA based on three prior state convictions: one 1983 first-degree robbery and two 1988 first-degree manslaughter convictions.
- The certificates of disposition establish Scott’s manslaughter convictions were under N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20(1) (causing death "with intent to cause serious physical injury").
- The district court granted Scott’s successive § 2255 habeas petition, holding New York first-degree manslaughter can be committed by omission (failure to act where there is a legal duty) and therefore does not necessarily involve the "use of physical force" required by ACCA; it vacated Scott’s ACCA enhancement and resentenced him to time served.
- On resentencing the district court also held the Career Offender Guideline’s force clause did not apply for the same reasons, and that the statute did not match the Guideline’s enumerated offenses (murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault).
- The Second Circuit affirmed: (1) § 125.20(1) can be satisfied by omission; (2) a crime that may be committed by complete inaction does not categorically have as an element the "use . . . of physical force" under Curtis Johnson and ACCA; and (3) New York first-degree manslaughter does not match the generic definitions of the enumerated offenses in the Career Offender Guideline.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Scott) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether NY first-degree manslaughter is a "violent felony" under ACCA's force clause | § 125.20(1) requires causing death while intending serious physical injury and thus involves the "use" of physical force | The statute can be satisfied by omission (failure to act despite a duty), so it does not categorically require "use" of force | Not a violent felony under ACCA because it can be committed by omission and thus need not involve the use of physical force |
| Whether the Career Offender Guideline's force clause covers NY first-degree manslaughter | Same as ACCA: mens rea + causation of death implies use of force | Same as above: omission theory precludes categorical use-of-force element | Force clause does not apply for the same reason it fails under ACCA |
| Whether NY first-degree manslaughter fits the Guideline's enumerated offenses (murder, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault) | The conduct punished by § 125.20(1) corresponds to murder or voluntary manslaughter (in aggregate a majority of states) or at least to aggravated assault | A majority of states do not treat the conduct as those generic offenses; New York statute sweeps more broadly | Does not match the generic definitions of murder, voluntary manslaughter, or aggravated assault; not an enumerated offense |
| Remedy / Sentencing outcome | ACCA enhancement should remain and higher sentence should be reinstated | ACCA enhancement invalid; sentence should be reduced | District court's vacatur of ACCA enhancement and resentencing to time served affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" in ACCA given its ordinary meaning; "violent force" = force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (knowing or intentional causation of bodily injury involves the use of physical force; indirect application of force can qualify)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (modified categorical approach and divisible statutes framework)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (determine "generic" offense by how term is used in majority of States)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) ("realistic probability" requirement when assessing categorical mismatch)
- United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2018) (apply realistic-probability test; courts must point to actual applications)
- United States v. Villanueva, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (applied Castleman reasoning in ACCA context; focus on causation of consequence)
- United States v. Stuckey, 878 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (statute that sweeps beyond ACCA definition cannot be ACCA predicate)
- United States v. Castillo, 896 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2018) (New York § 125.20 is divisible; discussion of manslaughter and generic definitions)
- People v. Steinberg, 79 N.Y.2d 673 (1992) (N.Y. Court of Appeals: first-degree manslaughter may be predicated on omission where duty to act exists)
- People v. Wong, 81 N.Y.2d 600 (1993) (reaffirmed that failure to seek medical aid can support homicide prosecution and treated Steinberg as a holding)