United States v. Schloff
2015 CAAF LEXIS 610
| C.A.A.F. | 2015Background
- Appellant, a physician’s assistant, allegedly placed a stethoscope on SGT CP’s breasts during a purported exam instead of examining the reported injury site.
- A general court-martial panel convicted Appellant of abusive sexual contact (Article 120, UCMJ) based on touching the victim’s breasts with a stethoscope and sentenced him to a dismissal.
- After sentencing, the military judge granted Appellant’s motion to dismiss, concluding Article 120(g)(2)’s definition of “sexual contact” required body-to-body contact and excluded object-to-body contact.
- The Government appealed under Article 62, UCMJ; the Army Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the military judge’s dismissal.
- The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review to decide whether Article 120(g)(2)’s definition of “sexual contact” includes object-to-body contact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 120(g)(2) "sexual contact" includes object-to-body contact | Gov.: "Touching" includes contact via an object; statute’s plain meaning and context allow object-to-body contact | Appellant: "Touching" unambiguously limited to body-to-body contact; "Touching may be accomplished by any part of the body" excludes objects | Held: "Sexual contact" may include object-to-body contact; conviction adequately stated the offense |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (use ordinary meaning when statute lacks definition)
- United States v. Vargas, 74 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (statutory-interpretation standard)
- United States v. Rauscher, 71 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (standard for whether specification states an offense)
- United States v. McPherson, 73 M.J. 393 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (interpretation considers language, context, broader statutory scheme)
- United States v. Moss, 73 M.J. 64 (C.A.A.F. 2014) ("may" is ordinarily permissive)
- Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014) (different wording in adjacent provisions suggests different meanings)
- Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (expressio unius canon: inclusion in one section and omission in another suggests difference in meaning)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (statutory-interpretation first step: plain meaning governs)