929 F.3d 584
8th Cir.2019Background
- Samantha Flute, a member of the Sisseton Sioux Tribe, gave birth to a live, full-term infant who died about four hours after birth; autopsy attributed death to combined drug toxicity from substances Flute ingested while pregnant.
- Flute tested positive for multiple drugs and admitted ingesting excess lorazepam, snorting hydrocodone she believed was laced with cocaine, and taking cough medicine shortly before delivery.
- The United States indicted Flute under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1112 (involuntary manslaughter) and 1153 (Indian Country jurisdiction).
- Flute moved to dismiss, arguing § 1112 does not apply to a mother for prenatal conduct (and that an unborn child is not a "human being" under § 1112); district court granted dismissal relying on the exception in the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (18 U.S.C. § 1841).
- The government appealed; the Eighth Circuit reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and considered whether the victim was a "human being" and whether the statute covers a mother’s prenatal conduct that causes death after birth.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Flute) | Defendant's Argument (U.S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the deceased infant is a "human being" under § 1112 when injuries occurred in utero but death occurred after birth | Baby was not a "human being" at time injuries were inflicted in utero, so § 1112 does not apply | Born-Alive Infants Protection Act defines "human being" to include any infant born alive; infant died after birth and thus is a protected victim | Held: Infant is a "human being" under the Born-Alive Act; § 1112 applies because death occurred after live birth |
| Whether § 1112 extends to criminalize a mother for prenatal conduct that causes death after birth | § 1112 was not intended to reach a mother for prenatal conduct; district court invoked § 1841 exception to bar prosecution | § 1841’s mother exception applies only within § 1841; it cannot be imported into § 1112; plain statutory text covers a born-alive victim and the defendant | Held: § 1841 exception does not limit § 1112; § 1112 unambiguously covers a mother whose prenatal conduct causes death after birth |
| Whether the Unborn Victims of Violence Act (18 U.S.C. § 1841) bars prosecution of a mother under other federal statutes | § 1841(c)(3) shows Congress intended to preclude prosecuting a woman for acts toward her unborn child across federal statutes | § 1841’s language (“Nothing in this section”) confines its effects to that section alone; no cross-statutory exception exists | Held: § 1841 cannot be read to create an exception in unrelated statutes; district court erred in relying on § 1841 |
| Whether court should resolve Flute’s as-applied due process/vagueness challenge at dismissal | Flute argued § 1112 is vague as applied and would violate due process to apply to prenatal conduct | Government opposed dismissal on statutory grounds and asked remand for as-applied consideration | Held: Court did not decide as-applied constitutional challenge; remanded to district court to address it in the first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Spencer, 839 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (common-law rule treating live-born infants who die from prenatal injuries as human victims)
- United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2011) (§ 1841’s definitions and scope are limited to that section)
- United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013) (statutory interpretation principles; Congress crafts exceptions explicitly)
- United States v. Steffen, 687 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for dismissal of an indictment)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (doctrine that courts should not force term-of-art definitions where they do not fit)
- Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (use of common-law meaning in statutory interpretation)
- Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (cardinal canon: give effect to statutory text as written)