United States v. Sager
2017 CAAF LEXIS 209
| C.A.A.F. | 2017Background
- Appellant Jeffrey D. Sager was tried by a mixed general court-martial for two specifications of abusive sexual contact under Article 120(d), UCMJ; one alleged the victim was incapable of consenting due to intoxication, the other alleged the victim was "asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware."
- The members acquitted Sager of the intoxication-based specification (oral sex) but convicted him of the "otherwise unaware" specification (manual stimulation); sentence included a bad-conduct discharge and 24 months confinement.
- The Navy‑Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed, holding that "asleep" and "unconscious" are merely examples of being "otherwise unaware," not independent theories of liability.
- Sager appealed to this court arguing (1) the CCA misinterpreted Article 120(d) by collapsing three statutory modes into one, and (2) the CCA improperly relied on facts tied to the acquitted intoxication charge when affirming the conviction.
- The CAAF reviewed statutory interpretation de novo and concluded the statutory phrase "asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware" presents distinct, alternative theories of criminal liability; the CCA erred and the case was remanded for reconsideration of factual sufficiency consistent with the correct legal view.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Article 120(d)’s phrase "asleep, unconscious, or otherwise unaware" creates separate theories of liability or a single theory | Sager: words are plain and disjunctive; each term creates an alternative theory and must be given effect (no surplusage) | Government: statute creates a single theory ("otherwise unaware") and "asleep"/"unconscious" are examples | Held: terms are separate alternatives; CCA erred in treating asleep/unconscious as only examples of "otherwise unaware" |
| Whether the CCA improperly relied on facts (intoxication) tied to an acquitted specification when affirming the other conviction | Sager: CCA considered intoxication evidence from the acquitted charge, creating legal/factual insufficiency and potential double jeopardy concerns | Government: even if alternatives exist, Sager must show prejudice; evidence of intoxication may still be relevant to being "unaware" | Held: Court declined to decide on reliance/acquittal issue now; remanded for CCA to reassess factual sufficiency under correct legal standard and consider applicability of Green doctrine |
Key Cases Cited
- Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (statutory construction canons)
- Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48 (disjunctive terms normally have separate meanings)
- Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (plain meaning controls statutory interpretation)
- Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (disjunctive terms and separate meanings)
- Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (canon against surplusage)
- Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (jury acquittal implications for alternative charges and double jeopardy)
- United States v. Atchak, 75 M.J. 193 (CAA.F. 2016) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- United States v. Pease, 75 M.J. 180 (CAA.F. 2016) (interpretation of UCMJ language; give meaning to each word)
- United States v. Adcock, 65 M.J. 18 (CAA.F. 2007) (avoid rendering statutory words meaningless)
- United States v. Falk, 50 M.J. 385 (CAA.F. 1999) (consult legislative history only if statute remains unclear)
- United States v. Brown, 65 M.J. 356 (CAA.F. 2007) (no requirement that panel unanimously agree on same theory of liability)