United States v. Ryan Luscombe
950 F.3d 1021
8th Cir.2020Background
- Luscombe ran Five Star Trading Group and solicited client funds by lying about past investment success, diverting $483,482.83 for personal use; charged with three counts of wire fraud, two counts of mail fraud, and one count of money laundering.
- Magistrate judge appointed counsel; Luscombe repeatedly sought new counsel, waived counsel after a Faretta hearing, and declined standby counsel (though standby counsel was later appointed).
- At trial Luscombe repeatedly interrupted, argued with witnesses, asked improper questions, attempted to interject testimony, served harassing subpoenas, and sent threatening emails to witnesses and his standby attorney.
- The magistrate judge revoked Luscombe’s bond and ordered him detained after the emails. On the third day of trial the district court terminated his pro se status and directed standby counsel to take over.
- Jury convicted Luscombe on all counts; district court calculated an advisory Guidelines range of 97–121 months but varied upward and imposed a 180-month sentence. Luscombe appealed the handling of his self-representation and his sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court erred by waiting until the third day to revoke Luscombe’s pro se status | Waiting until day three violated rights; court should have revoked earlier because Luscombe was clearly ineffective and possibly incompetent | Initial Faretta waiver was valid; day-1 conduct did not show incompetence or require immediate revocation | No error: waiver valid; no basis to revoke on day 1 or sua sponte order competency hearing |
| Whether terminating self-representation on day three was erroneous | Termination was disproportionate; conduct was poor lawyering, not ‘‘seriously obstructive’’ conduct warranting revocation | Luscombe’s persistent interruptions, harassment via subpoenas and threatening emails, and repeated warnings made conduct seriously obstructive | Affirmed: totality of conduct justified termination after warnings |
| Whether the court should have sua sponte ordered a competency evaluation (Edwards issue) | Luscombe’s behavior required a competency evaluation before allowing continued self-representation | No party requested evaluation; magistrate found valid waiver; trial behavior did not raise sufficient doubts | No abuse of discretion: no adequate reason to doubt competency and no need for sua sponte hearing |
| Whether the 180-month sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable | Court failed to adequately explain upward variance; double-counted factors; sentence excessive compared to typical fraud cases | Court considered the PSR and §3553(a) factors, cited prior similar scheme and lack of remorse, and reasonably weighed factors to justify variance | Affirmed: district court adequately explained and reasonably imposed the upward variance |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and requirements for a knowing waiver)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008) (limits on self-representation where competence to waive differs from competence to represent oneself)
- United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard for reviewing termination of self-representation)
- United States v. Turner, 644 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2011) (competency-hearing abuse-of-discretion standard)
- United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2012) (valid Faretta waiver after warnings; competency inquiry scope)
- United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2010) (termination of self-representation permitted for seriously obstructive misconduct)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (U.S. 1984) (limits on standby counsel’s participation and court control over proceedings)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (U.S. 2007) (standard for reviewing substantive reasonableness of sentence)