United States v. Ruben Mancillas
880 F.3d 297
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Ruben Mancillas was convicted by a jury of two counts of being a felon in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- At sentencing Mancillas requested a continuance to present recorded calls and requested his counsel Donahoe be withdrawn, stating he wanted to represent himself because counsel was ineffective.
- The district court denied both the continuance and Mancillas’ request to proceed pro se without conducting a Faretta colloquy, and sentenced Mancillas to 100 months.
- The Presentence Report applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on a 2007 Indiana conviction for strangulation, recommending a base offense level of 20.
- Mancillas argued on appeal that (1) he was denied the right to represent himself at sentencing and (2) Indiana strangulation is not a "crime of violence" for Guidelines purposes.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Mancillas was denied his Faretta right at sentencing | Mancillas: he clearly and unequivocally requested to proceed pro se and the court erred by denying without a colloquy | Government: court reasonably denied request given timing, multiple prior counsel, and need for counsel to be familiar with the case | Court: Mancillas unequivocally raised self-representation; denial without a Faretta colloquy was error; remand for resentencing to permit proper inquiry or waiver |
| Whether Indiana strangulation is a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (elements clause) | Mancillas: statute lacks the words "force" or "bodily injury" and could criminalize nonviolent conduct (e.g., covering mouth with blanket briefly) | Government: statute requires impeding breathing or circulation, which necessarily involves violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury | Court: Indiana strangulation requires impeding breathing/circulation and thus involves violent force; it qualifies as a crime of violence; base offense level 20 was correct |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (recognizes Sixth Amendment right to self-representation and requires a colloquy for waiver)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 (1984) (denial of Faretta right is not subject to harmless-error analysis)
- United States v. Harrington, 814 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2016) (defendant may knowingly waive counsel and proceed pro se at sentencing)
- United States v. Clark, 774 F.3d 1108 (7th Cir. 2014) (colloquy required when self-representation is clearly and unequivocally asserted)
- United States v. Duncan, 833 F.3d 751 (7th Cir. 2016) (clarifies Johnson’s force threshold; even a slap can qualify as physical force)
- United States v. Campbell, 865 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2017) (applies categorical approach to determine "crime of violence")