933 F.3d 1074
9th Cir.2019Background
- DHS received a tip that Jobe was running a large marijuana grow at his Van Nuys residence; agents corroborated factors like increased power use, PVC piping, planters, cooling fans, and late-night traffic.
- Special Agent Paul Cotcher prepared an affidavit describing the tip, observations, Jobe’s prior convictions, and a business named “420 Boutique.” A state judge issued a search warrant authorizing seizure of items including "hard drives."
- On Nov. 22, officers executed the state warrant and seized drugs, a pistol, the laptop, and other devices; the laptop was not searched that day.
- Cotcher contacted the USAO about federal prosecution, investigated further for ~10 days, then, after USAO agreed to prosecute, prepared a federal warrant affidavit; agents searched the laptop 20 days after seizure.
- Laptop evidence led to federal charges (identity theft, unauthorized access, mail fraud, felon-in-possession). The district court suppressed laptop evidence as a product of an unreasonable delay in obtaining the federal warrant; the government appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of seizure under state warrant | State warrant did not mention computers; seizure of laptop lacked probable cause. | Affidavit supported seizing items "tending to establish and document sales of marijuana," reasonably including digital devices. | Seizure was supported by objectively reasonable reliance on the state warrant; good-faith exception applies. |
| 20-day delay before federal search warrant | Delay between seizure and federal warrant was unreasonable and warrants suppression. | Delay was not deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent; Cotcher acted reasonably (consulted USAO, investigated, drafted affidavit). | Delay did not warrant exclusion; suppression not appropriate. |
| Applicability of exclusionary rule for delay | Exclusion should deter unreasonable delays that infringe Fourth Amendment rights. | Exclusion applies only where deterrence justifies social costs; here police conduct was not sufficiently culpable. | Exclusionary rule not triggered because conduct lacked the culpability (deliberate/reckless/gross negligence) and was an isolated, reasonable delay. |
| Good-faith reliance on warrants | Subsequent federal warrant can't cure initial unlawful seizure. | Good-faith reliance on a magistrate-authorized state warrant and a valid federal warrant supports admission. | Officers reasonably relied on warrants; no allegations of misleading omissions; good-faith reliance supports reversal of suppression. |
Key Cases Cited
- Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (exclusionary rule targets deliberate/reckless/grossly negligent or systemic negligence)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (good-faith reliance on warrant limits exclusionary rule)
- United States v. Cha, 597 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (delay-related suppression factors; officer culpability guideposts)
- United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (exclusionary rule’s deterrent purpose)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (weigh deterrent value against social costs of exclusion)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (probable cause standard for warrants)
- United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2015) (21-day delay reasonable where seizure was lawful via consent)
- United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1988) (delay in obtaining warrants for mass seizures; distinguished here)
