United States v. Roszkowski
700 F.3d 50
| 1st Cir. | 2012Background
- Roszkowski, a convicted felon, was tried for felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of a firearm with an altered serial number under § 922(k).
- He covertly contacted an undercover officer posing as an arms dealer and expressed intent to purchase multiple firearms and hollow-point ammunition for home defense.
- A planned exchange at a Rhode Island park led to a confrontation; Roszkowski discharged a weapon during arrest efforts and sustained a self-inflicted gunshot wound.
- Analysis of the recovered firearm showed an obliterated serial number; he was indicted and convicted on both counts and sentenced to 180 months.
- Roszkowski, proceeding pro se, challenged pretrial discovery of a confidential informant, admission of certain trial evidence, and the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) and § 922(k) under the Commerce Clause.
- The First Circuit affirms the convictions, rejecting each challenged claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court erred in denying CI discovery for entrapment defense | Roszkowski argues entrapment defense required CI testimony | Roszkowski contends CI testimony would reveal government inducement | No reversible error; disclosure denial did not prejudice entrapment defense. |
| Whether admission of Detective Zarrella's gunshot testimony was proper | Evidence was improper propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) | Testimony was intrinsic to the charged crime and highly probative | Not plain error; testimony was highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial. |
| Whether failure to redact hollow-point ammunition references was reversible error | Hollow-point discussion was prejudicial under Rules 404(b) and 403 | References were intrinsic to the offense and minimally prejudicial | Not plain error; admission did not affect substantial rights; trial instructions mitigated prejudice. |
| Whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 922(k) are constitutional under the Commerce Clause | Sebelius undermines Congress's power to regulate mere possession | Statutes regulate conduct with substantial interstate commerce nexus | Constitutional; statutes valid under Commerce Clause; Sebelius does not undermine them. |
Key Cases Cited
- Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to present a complete defense; not violated here)
- United States v. Acosta, 67 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 1995) (entrapment threshold requires inducement and lack of predisposition)
- United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641 (1st Cir. 1996) (predisposition essential to entrapment defense)
- United States v. Dávila-Nieves, 670 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (stings ordinarily do not amount to entrapment)
- United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2010) (high threshold for improper inducement; stings may induce)
- United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2009) (plus factor required for entrapment; intimidation/pressure example)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1988) (entrapment reasonableness standard)
- United States v. Rodriguez-Estrada, 877 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1989) (role of jury instructions in prejudice analysis)
- United States v. Joost, 133 F.3d 125 (1st Cir. 1998) (Sebelius-like Commerce Clause challenge rejected earlier)
- National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (limits on Commerce Clause power and individual mandate context)
- United States v. Combs, 555 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (possession of firearm with interstate nexus under Commerce Clause)