United States v. Ross Thacker, 4f4th569

Background

Ross Thacker convicted (2002) of multiple armed robberies and two 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts; district court imposed mandatory consecutive § 924(c) terms producing a ~33-year sentence (7 years + 25 years).
First Step Act (2018) amended § 924(c) to prevent automatic "stacking" of enhanced consecutive terms unless the earlier § 924(c) conviction was final and from a separate case; Congress made that amendment prospective only.
In 2020 Thacker filed a compassionate-release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), citing (1) elevated COVID-19 risks from diabetes and hypertension and (2) the sentencing disparity created by the First Step Act.
The district court denied relief, finding Thacker’s health conditions did not present extraordinary and compelling reasons and concluding the § 924(c) amendment—by its terms—could not be applied retroactively to reduce his lawfully imposed sentence.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the First Step Act’s anti-stacking amendment cannot, alone or combined with other factors, supply an "extraordinary and compelling" reason to reduce a pre‑Act sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can the First Step Act’s amendment to § 924(c) itself constitute an "extraordinary and compelling" reason for compassionate release?	Thacker: the amendment creates a sentencing disparity that is extraordinary and warrants reduction.	Government: Congress made the amendment prospective; courts cannot use § 3582 to retroactively alter statutory penalties.	No — the amendment cannot alone (or as part of the reason) constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason.
Does § 3582(c)(1)(A) authorize reducing mandatory minimums lawfully imposed before the First Step Act’s effective date?	Thacker: § 3582’s broad discretion permits relief to address sentencing disparities.	Government: Allowing that would override Congress’s express directive and infringe separation of powers.	No — § 3582 does not authorize using compassionate release to circumvent Congress’s prospective limitation.
Do Thacker’s medical conditions and COVID-19 risk qualify as "extraordinary and compelling"?	Thacker: Type‑2 diabetes and hypertension increase COVID risk, supporting release.	Government: BOP managed health; facility conditions did not show uncontrolled risk.	No — district court found health risks were managed and not extraordinary here.
Is the Sentencing Commission policy statement binding on prisoner‑initiated § 3582 motions?	Thacker: Relied on policy statement to define extraordinary and compelling reasons.	Government: Policy statement binds BOP-initiated motions but not prisoner-initiated ones.	Policy statement is not binding on prisoner-initiated motions (per Gunn); district court’s alternative statutory ground controlled.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 1178 (7th Cir. 2020) (district courts have broad but not boundless discretion to define "extraordinary and compelling" for prisoner-initiated § 3582 motions)
United States v. McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020) (held First Step Act sentencing disparity may constitute extraordinary and compelling reason)
United States v. Jarvis, 999 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2021) (refused to allow nonretroactive First Step Act change alone to supply extraordinary and compelling reason)
United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035 (10th Cir. 2021) (sentencing disparity from nonretroactive change may support release only in combination with other factors)
United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821 (10th Cir. 2021) (expressed limitations on using compassionate release to upset lawful, statutorily required sentences)
United States v. Owens, 996 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2021) (permitting consideration of First Step Act changes alongside other grounds for relief)
Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993) (considered constitutional challenges to § 924(c) and found no facial infirmity)