United States v. Rosie Diggles
957 F.3d 551
| 5th Cir. | 2020Background
- Rosie, Walter, and Anita Diggles were convicted of fraud tied to hurricane-relief funds; Rosie’s custodial sentence was also affirmed on Guideline-enhancement grounds.
- District court imposed supervised release and large restitution orders; the written judgments included four financial-related supervised-release conditions.
- At sentencing the judge orally stated he was adopting the PSR’s recommended conditions rather than reciting each condition verbatim.
- Defendants objected on appeal that the court failed to ‘‘pronounce’’ those supervised-release conditions in the defendant’s presence, challenging incorporation-by-reference of the PSR.
- The Fifth Circuit heard the case en banc to resolve conflicting precedents about when pronouncement is required and whether oral adoption of PSR recommendations suffices.
- The court affirmed the judgments, holding (1) pronouncement is required only for discretionary conditions under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and (2) oral adoption of a disclosed PSR listing gives notice and thus constitutes pronouncement when the defendant had an opportunity to object.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether oral adoption of a written PSR list satisfies the pronouncement requirement | Oral adoption of a disclosed PSR is sufficient notice and thus pronouncement | Adoption is not the same as pronouncing each discretionary condition in court | Held: Oral in-court adoption of a disclosed PSR recommending conditions constitutes pronouncement if defendant had notice and chance to object |
| Which supervised-release conditions require in‑court pronouncement | Only conditions that are discretionary under § 3583(d) require pronouncement | All ‘‘special’’ conditions listed in judgment must be pronounced | Held: Pronouncement required for conditions that are discretionary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); no need for pronouncement of statutorily required conditions |
| Standard of appellate review when defendants first object on appeal | Where defendants had opportunity to object at sentencing, review is plain error | Defendants contend forfeiture should not apply because they lacked proper pronouncement | Held: If defendant had notice and opportunity to object at sentencing, failure to object triggers plain‑error review; if no opportunity, review is de novo/forgiveness of forfeiture applies |
| Whether district court erred in imposing three financial conditions (financial disclosure, credit restriction, gambling ban) without reciting them | Government: adoption of PSR satisfied pronouncement; conditions were properly imposed | Defendants: court failed to pronounce discretionary conditions and so error requires vacatur | Held: No pronouncement error—those three conditions were discretionary but were pronounced by oral adoption of the disclosed PSR; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (due process presence standard)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (note: court relied on Gagnon principles as reported in the opinion—see Gagnon jurisprudence)
- Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (plain‑error standard)
- United States v. Torres‑Aguilar, 352 F.3d 934 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing pronouncement of conditions)
- United States v. Vega, 332 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2003) (standing orders and conditions)
- United States v. Rouland, 726 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 2013) (admitted memo and notice issues)
- United States v. Rivas‑Estrada, 906 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating when court only referenced PSR recommendations)
- United States v. Mudd, 685 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2012) (forfeiture/notice principles)
- United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding oral adoption of PSR as adequate notice)
- United States v. Weathers, 631 F.3d 560 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (absence of pronouncement tantamount to sentencing in absentia)