United States v. Ronn Darnell Sterling
738 F.3d 228
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- On Jan. 14, 2010 a masked robber used a silver handgun to vault a Regions Bank teller counter in Smyrna, GA; a getaway car later linked to defendants Brumfield (driver/owner) and Sterling was located and towed. A bag in the trunk contained matching clothing and a silver firearm; the bag bore both defendants’ fingerprints and Sterling’s DNA was in the gloves.
- Defendants were indicted on three counts: armed bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113), use of a firearm in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)).
- The government sought and the court admitted under Rule 404(b) the defendants’ prior 1995 armed bank robbery convictions (same participants, similar facts: vaulting teller counter, silver gun, masks, getaway driver) for limited purposes (intent, plan, preparation, lack of mistake).
- At the start of trial Sterling repeatedly refused to participate, was interviewed in an adjacent room, was warned that persistent disruptive/nonresponsive conduct would result in being deemed to have waived his right to be present, and the court found he waived his presence; Sterling watched by live feed but did not attend in person.
- Jury instructions limited the use of the prior-conviction evidence to intent, plan, preparation, and absence of mistake; the jury convicted both defendants on all counts. Sterling moved for a new trial (claiming Rule 43 violation) and Brumfield moved for acquittal on the gun-count; both appeals followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial commenced in defendant Sterling’s presence and whether his Rule 43 right to be present was waived | Government: trial may commence on the day of jury selection and a defendant may waive presence by voluntary absence or disruptive conduct after being warned | Sterling: trial had not commenced in his presence; court should have forced him into the courtroom and explicitly announced trial start before allowing waiver | Court held trial had commenced that day (interview room proceeding and explanation) and Sterling voluntarily waived his right to be present; proceeding in absentia was permissible |
| Admissibility of defendants’ prior 1995 armed-robbery convictions under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) | Government: prior conviction admissible to show intent, plan, preparation, identity, and knowledge (esp. that Brumfield knew a gun would be used) | Defendants: prior convictions were improperly admitted as impermissible propensity evidence and were unduly prejudicial | Court held evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) for limited purposes (intent, plan, preparation, lack of mistake; knowledge as to Brumfield); any overbreadth as to Sterling was harmless given overwhelming other evidence |
| Sufficiency of the evidence against Brumfield for the § 924(c) gun-use/knowledge element | Government: circumstantial proof (prior joint armed robbery, planning over months, association with Sterling, physical evidence in car) sufficed to infer Brumfield knew a gun would be used | Brumfield: insufficient evidence that he knew a gun would be used or that he aided/abetted the firearm use | Court held the evidence (including prior conviction showing he previously participated when a gun was used) was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find knowledge and sustain convictions |
| Harmlessness of any Rule 404(b) error as to Sterling | Government: even if 404(b) admission was erroneous as to Sterling, other evidence (fingerprints, DNA, eyewitness descriptions, physical evidence) rendered any error harmless | Sterling: prior-conviction evidence was unduly prejudicial and likely affected the verdict | Court held that, as to Sterling, any prejudice from prior-conviction evidence was harmless given overwhelming independent proof of guilt |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2013) (standard for reviewing Rule 43 interpretation)
- United States v. Bradford, 237 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (defendant may waive presence by voluntary absence after trial commencement; balancing public interest)
- Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993) (Rule 43 requires initial presence at start of trial; waiver allowed if defendant was initially present and voluntarily absent)
- United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139 (11th Cir. 1993) (trial may not commence in absentia if defendant was never present at its start)
- United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011) (day-of-jury-selection rule; defendants removed for disruptive behavior may watch by feed; harmless-error analysis)
- United States v. Crews, 695 F.2d 519 (11th Cir. 1983) (defendant may waive right to be present during jury selection)
- United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) (Rule 404(b) admission reviewed for clear abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736 (11th Cir. 2010) (standard for sufficiency review)
- United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2008) (three-part test for Rule 404(b) admissibility)
- United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2007) (intent is a proper nonpropensity purpose under Rule 404(b) when defendant pleads not guilty)
- United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355 (11th Cir. 1998) (intent as material issue permitting 404(b) evidence)
- United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2005) (recognizing inherent prejudice of extrinsic-act evidence)
- United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (Beecum balancing for probative value vs. prejudice)
- United States v. Pollock, 926 F.2d 1044 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussion on when extrinsic evidence may be essential to government’s case)
- United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513 (11th Cir. 1990) (prior crime need not be identical to be probative)
- United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir. 1995) (temporal gap between similar crimes does not preclude admissibility)
- United States v. Pendegraph, 791 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1986) (limits on inferring knowledge from mere role as getaway driver)
- United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011) (clearly erroneous standard for reviewing district court factual findings)
