United States v. Ronald Repak
852 F.3d 230
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Ronald Repak was Executive Director of the Johnstown Redevelopment Authority (JRA) from 1977–2013; JRA awarded contracts and grants and relied heavily on the director’s recommendations to its Board.
- Contractors testified Repak repeatedly solicited items (tickets, golf outings, etc.) and that acquiescing was needed to keep JRA work; two charged benefits at trial were a new roof (EADS) and excavating services for his son’s gym (L&M).
- A six-count federal indictment charged Hobbs Act extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951) and federal program bribery (18 U.S.C. § 666) tied to three factual episodes (Steelers tickets, roof, excavation); Repak was convicted on counts related to the roof and excavation (Counts 3–6) and acquitted on the Steelers-ticket counts.
- The District Court admitted extensive other-acts evidence (uncharged solicitations) under Rule 404(b) and evidence of Repak’s affair with his assistant to show intent and credibility; limiting instructions were given.
- Repak was sentenced to 42 months’ imprisonment (concurrent counts) and ordered restitution; he appealed raising evidentiary, sufficiency, instruction, indictment-amendment, and prosecutorial-misconduct claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Gov't) | Defendant's Argument (Repak) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of other-acts evidence under Rule 404(b) | Other acts show non‑propensity purposes: intent/knowledge and provide context/background | Admission lacked articulated chain of inferences; prejudicial and improperly admitted | Admission was ultimately proper: Gov’t proffered non‑propensity purpose; despite District Court’s weak articulation, chain of inferences existed; probative value outweighed prejudice and limiting instructions were given |
| Admission of evidence of affair (Rule 403) | Affair was relevant to motive, intent, and to assess assistant Walter’s credibility | Affair was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial | District Court did not abuse discretion; affair evidence was relevant and limited in scope so prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value |
| Sufficiency of evidence for Hobbs Act and § 666 convictions | Circumstantial proof (solicitations, contractors’ fear of losing work, payments/services, Repak’s statements) supports knowledge, corrupt intent, and that facilitating JRA contract awards constituted official acts | Government failed to prove an agreement/intent; under McDonnell the award of JRA contracts is not the required type of "official act" | Evidence was sufficient. Circumstantial evidence supported knowledge and corrupt intent; facilitating award of JRA contracts fits McDonnell’s definition of an "official act" (focused agency determination) |
| Jury instructions / constructive amendment | Instructions tracked statutory elements and indictment; limited other‑acts use; jury charged on the specific transactions alleged | Instructions allegedly broadened the elements (permitting conviction for any official act or any JRA transaction) and thereby constructively amended the indictment | No reversible error: instructions read as a whole tracked the indictment and focused the jury on the alleged facilitation of JRA contract awards; no constructive amendment occurred |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing | N/A (Gov’t) | Prosecutor’s references to affair, alleged facts not in evidence, expression of opinion, and asking jury to "send a message" denied fair trial | Remarks were sometimes inappropriate but, considered in context (curative instructions, rebuttal, strength of evidence, defense arguments), did not amount to plain-error violating due process |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2014) (Rule 404(b) requires articulated chain of inferences and meaningful Rule 403 balancing)
- United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278 (3d Cir. 2014) (proponent must explain how other-acts evidence proves a non‑propensity purpose)
- Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) (Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right requires proof defendant knew payment was made in return for official acts)
- McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016) (definition of "official act" under bribery law; must be a specific, focused matter and a decision or action on that matter)
- United States v. Willis, 844 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2016) (admission of prior bribe evidence to show intent and that payments were not gifts)
- United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993) (other-acts evidence admitted to show broader plan and knowledge)
- Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (framework for admissibility of other-acts evidence)