United States v. Ronald Peppers
899 F.3d 211
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Ronnie Peppers pled guilty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) in 2003 to being a felon in possession and was sentenced to the ACCA mandatory minimum of 15 years based on at least three prior state/federal convictions listed in the information. The plea required a 15-year sentence.
- Peppers had multiple prior convictions including two Pennsylvania robbery convictions (1979 juvenile adjudication and 1985 adult conviction) and a Pennsylvania burglary conviction (1984).
- After the Supreme Court invalidated the ACCA residual clause in Johnson v. United States (2015) and Welch made that ruling retroactive, Peppers filed a second/successive § 2255 motion claiming his ACCA enhancement depended on the now-unconstitutional residual clause.
- The district court denied relief, concluding Peppers’ priors qualified under the ACCA’s other clauses; Peppers appealed and the Third Circuit granted a COA on the Johnson issue.
- The Third Circuit held (1) Peppers satisfied the § 2255(h) gatekeeping showing because he may have been sentenced under the residual clause, (2) a (C) plea does not bar collateral relief when the stipulated sentence would be unlawful under a new constitutional rule, (3) post‑sentencing Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ACCA (e.g., Mathis, Descamps, Johnson (2010)) may be used to adjudicate Johnson § 2255 claims once the gate is met, and (4) Pennsylvania robbery convictions do not categorically qualify as ACCA violent felonies under the elements clause, while the burglary conviction was not shown by Peppers to be non-qualifying under the elements clause.
Issues
| Issue | Peppers' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2255(h) requires proof that the sentencing court actually relied on the ACCA residual clause (gatekeeping) | § 2255(h) is satisfied if movant shows sentence may have been predicated on the residual clause | Movant must prove the sentencing court in fact used the residual clause (or that sentence depended solely on it) | Movant need only show it is possible he was sentenced under the residual clause (prima facie showing) so district court can fully explore the claim |
| Whether a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea bars collateral attack on a sentence rendered unlawful by Johnson | The (C) plea does not bar collateral attack because parties cannot stipulate to an unlawful sentence; if ACCA no longer applies the stipulated 15-yr term is unauthorized | (C) plea and its stipulated sentence foreclose attack — defendant expressly accepted 15 years | (C) plea does not preclude § 2255 relief when a new rule (Johnson) renders the stipulated sentence unlawful |
| Whether post-sentencing Supreme Court decisions (Mathis, Descamps, Johnson (2010)) can be relied on to decide ACCA predicate status on collateral review | Once the Johnson gate is satisfied, courts may use post-sentencing Supreme Court interpretations to apply the ACCA correctly | Only law existing at sentencing should be used; post-sentencing cases cannot be bootstrapped into a Johnson claim | Once the gate is met under § 2255(h), movant may rely on post-sentencing Supreme Court statutory/interpretive decisions to determine whether priors qualify |
| Whether Peppers’ Pennsylvania robbery and burglary convictions are ACCA violent felonies absent the residual clause | Robbery convictions do not categorically qualify under the elements clause; burglary is ambiguous under elements clause on this record | Robbery and burglary qualify under the elements or enumerated clauses (so Johnson does not help) | Pennsylvania robbery (third-degree provision: "force however slight") is broader than ACCA "physical force" (Johnson (2010)) and thus does not categorically qualify; burglary cannot be shown by Peppers to be non-qualifying under the elements clause, so burglary remains a qualifying predicate on this record |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (held Johnson retroactive on collateral review)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (clarified the categorical/modified categorical approach for enumerated offenses)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (limited use of the modified categorical approach to divisible statutes)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (held ACCA "physical force" means violent force capable of causing pain or injury)
- Broce v. United States, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (explained finality and scope of collateral attack after guilty plea)