United States v. Roman Harlan, 960 F.3d 1089

Defendant Roman Gabriel Harlan was tried and convicted of federal domestic-violence offenses (strangling, assault with a dangerous weapon, and domestic assault as a habitual offender) and sentenced within the Guidelines to concurrent terms (90 months and 60 months).
Trial was set for June 18, 2018. With Harlan’s consent, counsel moved for a continuance on May 30; the magistrate granted a continuance to August 20 and excluded the intervening period from Speedy Trial Act calculations.
After the continuance was granted, Harlan told counsel he did not want to waive Speedy Trial Act rights and later sought substitute counsel; the magistrate denied substitution after a June 5 hearing.
Mid-trial, before the government’s second witness, Harlan moved to proceed pro se; the district court denied the motion after finding Harlan lacked the present ability to represent himself.
On appeal Harlan challenged (1) denial of substitute counsel, (2) the continuance/Speedy Trial Act exclusion, (3) denial of the mid-trial pro se request, and (4) the substantive reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence; the Eighth Circuit affirmed on all grounds.

Issue	Harlan's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Denial of substitute counsel	Counsel had an irreconcilable conflict or communication breakdown warranting new counsel	No justifiable dissatisfaction; denial was within court discretion	Affirmed — Harlan failed to show conflict, irreconcilable breakdown, or justifiable dissatisfaction
Trial continuance & Speedy Trial Act exclusion	Continuance was against Harlan’s wishes and counsel could not reasonably object	Harlan initially consented; continuance properly granted for ends-of-justice reasons	Affirmed — exclusion lawful; factors (counsel preparation, complexity) supported continuance
Mid-trial request to proceed pro se	Harlan wanted to represent himself because dissatisfied with counsel’s trial decisions	Request was untimely, would disrupt trial, and Harlan lacked competence to proceed immediately	Affirmed — denial proper because request was not timely and defendant lacked present ability to self-represent
Substantive reasonableness of sentence	Court overemphasized Harlan’s criminal history and punishment	Court considered §3553 factors and public safety/ deterrence concerns	Affirmed — within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable under the totality of circumstances

United States v. Swinney, 970 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1992) (district court has discretion on continuances and substitution of counsel)
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (appellate courts may excuse Rule 59 waiver in interests of justice)
United States v. Kelley, 774 F.3d 434 (8th Cir. 2014) (standards for justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel)
United States v. Jones, 795 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2015) (no conflict for disagreement over continuances)
United States v. Barrow, 287 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2002) (factors for substitute counsel requests)
United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2012) (opposition to counsel’s continuance request does not prevent exclusion under the Speedy Trial Act)
United States v. Prucha, 856 F.3d 1184 (8th Cir. 2017) (timeliness requirement for invoking the right to self-representation)
Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011) (right to self-representation must be timely and competent)
United States v. Young, 644 F.3d 757 (8th Cir. 2011) (abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness of sentence)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (standards for sentencing procedural and substantive review)