United States v. Roman, 942 F.3d 43

In Jan 2014 a cooperating informant (CS) told investigators in a written, initialed statement that three kilograms of seized cocaine "came from Javier Gonzalez" and that Roman had dropped the kilos off at CS's business in Springfield. The written statement was not provided to DEA Agent Scott Smith, who later drafted the warrant affidavit.
Smith prepared a single affidavit (used for seven warrants) alleging, among other things, that drug transactions occurred at Roman's Holyoke business (TWC), that Roman was a "known cocaine trafficker," and that CS would obtain kilogram quantities at TWC. The affidavit also identified a Chicopee address as Roman's residence and noted the family-registered Acura had been seen there.
A magistrate issued warrants; searches were executed and Roman arrested. Roman moved to suppress and obtained a Franks hearing alleging material misrepresentations and omissions in the affidavit.
The district court found reckless misstatements and omissions (notably failing to disclose CS's written statement and misstating the transaction location), reformed the affidavit, suppressed evidence from TWC, and held the reformed affidavit still failed to establish probable cause to search Roman's residence.
The government appealed the suppression of residential evidence (cash, firearm, ID). The First Circuit affirmed, holding the reformed affidavit lacked a sufficient nexus between alleged drug activity and the Chicopee home.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the reformed affidavit established probable cause/nexus to search Roman's residence	Reformed affidavit contains direct and inferential links (vehicle registered to wife seen at residence; surveillance of Roman carrying a "weighted bag" into Cano Used Tire) tying home to criminal evidence	Misrepresentations removed by Franks leave no direct nexus; remaining facts are speculative and do not show items sought would be at the residence	No probable cause; suppression of residential search affirmed
Whether inference from general law-enforcement opinion that traffickers keep evidence at home (Feliz) applies	Large-scale conspiracy and Roman's alleged central role permit the Feliz inference that evidence would be kept at his residence	Roman was not shown to be a long-time, established trafficker; no corroboration or specific facts linking residence; Feliz not analogous	Feliz inapplicable; facts far weaker than Feliz and do not support such inference
Whether magistrate's probable cause finding merits deference despite Franks errors	Magistrate decision should receive deference	Proven reckless misstatements/omissions defeat deference under Franks/Burke	No deference owed; court reviews under the correct standard and finds insufficient evidence

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (the home receives heightened Fourth Amendment protection)
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (warrant affidavits may be challenged for intentional or reckless false statements)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (totality-of-the-circumstances test for probable cause)
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (nexus requires reasonable cause to believe the items sought are at the place searched)
United States v. Feliz, 182 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 1999) (long-term trafficker + no other residence can support inference that evidentiary items are at the home)
United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2015) (explaining "commission" and "nexus" elements for search warrants)
Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2005) (no deference to magistrate when reckless misstatements/omissions are shown)
United States v. Ribeiro, 397 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2005) (need for specific observations linking drug activity to a residence)
United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 1997) (probable cause is fact-specific; no per se rule permitting home searches)
United States v. Bain, 874 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2017) (skepticism toward relying on generalized officer opinion absent corroborating specific facts)