United States v. Roger Lardrell McCullough
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4527
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- McCullough was stopped after an officer used a plate-reading device and observed a decorative bracket partially obscuring an Alabama plate; he fled for several miles before stopping.
- Officer smelled marijuana; searches of the truck, McCullough, and a hotel room (warrant obtained) yielded marijuana, scales, cash, phones, and a handgun.
- McCullough, a felon with multiple prior drug convictions and on supervised release, pleaded guilty before a magistrate judge to possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- The district court reassigned the case to a different district judge for sentencing; McCullough moved to reassign back under Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1), arguing the original judge should sentence him.
- McCullough moved to suppress the traffic-stop evidence (arguing Alabama law required only alphanumeric characters be visible) and later sought a downward variance based on post-release rehabilitation; the court denied suppression and sentenced him within the Guidelines (294 months).
- On appeal McCullough argued (1) Rule 25 barred reassignment after a guilty plea, (2) the stop/search were unlawful, (3) reassignment back to the initial judge was required, (4) sentencing was procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and (5) a Mathis-based challenge to career-offender status (raised late).
Issues
| Issue | McCullough's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b)(1) prevents reassignment for a defendant who pleaded guilty | Rule 25 applies because accepting a guilty plea is like a "mini-bench trial," so only the judge who presided may sentence unless absent/disabled | Rule 25 governs only after a verdict or finding of guilty at trial; guilty pleas are governed by Rule 11 and are not trials, so reassignment is permitted | Rule 25 does not apply to guilty pleas; reassignment was lawful |
| Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reassign the case back to the original judge | The sentencing judge showed unfamiliarity with the record (and with Pepper), so the case should be returned | The sentencing judge became familiar with the record before sentencing and did not abuse discretion | No abuse of discretion; refusal to reassign was proper |
| Whether the traffic stop and ensuing searches should be suppressed as unlawful | Officer lacked reasonable basis to stop because Alabama law requires only alphanumeric characters be visible; stop/search invalid | Officer’s belief that the plate was not "plainly visible" was objectively reasonable under Heien; stop and searches lawful | Stop and searches were lawful; suppression denied |
| Whether the sentence (and career-offender challenge) was procedurally/substantively unreasonable or preserved | Court ignored Pepper and exhibits; marijuana offense less serious than other drugs; Mathis-based challenge to career-offender status raised late | Court considered exhibits, Pepper did not apply, sentence within Guidelines and supported by criminal history; Mathis issue waived for failing to raise in opening brief | Sentencing was reasonable; procedural and substantive challenges fail; Mathis argument waived |
Key Cases Cited
- Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (post-sentencing rehabilitation may be considered on resentencing after vacatur)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 576 U.S. 54 (2015) (an officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of law can justify a stop)
- United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (standards for reviewing substantive reasonableness of sentences)
- United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597 (5th Cir. 1969) (district courts have inherent power to reassign cases for efficient administration)
- United States v. McGuinness, 769 F.2d 695 (11th Cir. 1985) (review of a judge’s decision to perform sentencing duties in a case he did not try)