United States v. Rogelio Teran-Salas
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 17716
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Defendant Rogelio Teran-Salas pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after deportation (8 U.S.C. § 1326). A 2011 Texas conviction for possession with intent to deliver 4–200 grams of cocaine was used in the PSR to impose a 16‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) and to treat the prior as an aggravated felony for sentencing exposure.
- Teran‑Salas argued the Texas statute is broader than the federal ‘‘drug trafficking’’ definition because Texas includes ‘‘administering,’’ which the federal guideline definition does not plainly cover absent a practitioner’s lawful order.
- The district court applied the enhancement, finding the Texas statute sufficiently narrow to match the federal definition, and sentenced Teran‑Salas to 57 months (after a downward departure in criminal history category).
- On appeal the Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the prior conviction qualifies as a drug trafficking offense and as an aggravated felony, applying the categorical/modified categorical approach.
- The court found the Texas provision divisible (manufacture, deliver, possess with intent to deliver) and applied the modified categorical approach to the indictment language (possession with intent to deliver 4–200 g cocaine).
- The court held there is no realistic probability Texas would have prosecuted Teran‑Salas under an ‘‘administering’’ theory that would fall outside the federal definition; thus the prior conviction qualified as a drug trafficking offense and aggravated felony, and the enhancement was proper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Texas possession‑with‑intent statute counts as a federal "drug trafficking offense" for U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 enhancement | Teran‑Salas: Texas includes "administering," so statute is broader; indictment doesn’t show he wasn’t convicted for administering | Government: State and federal definitions are effectively aligned; administering (in relevant cases) maps onto federal dispensing or distributing | Held: Affirmed. Modified categorical approach and common‑sense review show no realistic probability Texas prosecuted for administering in a way outside federal definition; enhancement valid |
| Whether the prior conviction is an "aggravated felony" for statutory sentencing exposure | Teran‑Salas: Same scope problem; if not a federal drug trafficking offense, it cannot be an aggravated felony | Government: The conviction fits the federal controlled‑substance trafficking definitions and thus is an aggravated felony | Held: Affirmed. Because conviction qualifies as a drug trafficking offense under federal definition, it also qualifies as an aggravated felony |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach for prior‑conviction comparison)
- Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (permits limited documents under modified categorical approach)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (clarifies divisible statutes and use of modified categorical approach)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (requires realistic probability, not mere possibility, when comparing state and federal offenses)
- Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (articulates realistic‑probability standard)
- United States v. Carrasco‑Tercero, 745 F.3d 192 (5th Cir.; applies realistic‑probability requirement)
- United States v. Sandoval‑Ruiz, 543 F.3d 733 (5th Cir.; examines least culpable conduct and burden to show realistic probability)
- United States v. Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 541 (5th Cir.; de novo review standard for qualifying prior convictions)
- United States v. Baker, 742 F.3d 618 (5th Cir.; standard of review for guideline interpretation)
- United States v. Garcia‑Figueroa, 753 F.3d 179 (5th Cir.; requiring defendant to point to state cases showing statute applied in the challenged manner)