United States v. Rodriguez
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25243
| 6th Cir. | 2011Background
- Rodriguez pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 500g+ of cocaine, with a plea noting potential career offender sentencing under USSG § 4B1.1.
- PSR counted Ohio felony convictions for aggravated robbery (1995), aggravated assault (1995), and felonious assault (1999) as predicate offenses.
- District court adopted the PSR, granted a six-level downward departure for substantial assistance, and sentenced Rodriguez to 144 months with eight years of supervised release.
- Rodriguez did not object to the PSR or the sentence; he appealed arguing Ohio aggravated assault is not a crime of violence and that the felonious assault conviction was void ab initio.
- Court applies the categorical approach to determine crime of violence and later addresses collateral attack principles under Custis and Aguilar-Diaz.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Ohio aggravated assault qualify as a crime of violence? | Rodriguez: aggravated assault not a crime of violence under 4B1.2. | Rodriguez: (implied) disputes enumerated/elemental basis for violence. | Yes; Ohio § 2903.12 qualifies as enumerated crime of violence; conviction counts. |
| Can Rodriguez collaterally attack his felonious assault conviction to defeat career offender status? | Rodriguez: conviction void ab initio due to post-release control error. | Rodriguez: Custis/Aguilar-Diaz allow collateral attack only for uncounseled/state issues; voidness not reviewable here. | No; collateral attack barred; district court’s use of felonious assault as predicate stands. |
| Is Begay controlling or otherwise necessary for this career-offender analysis? | Rodriguez: Begay undermines treating aggravated assault as violent under residual clause. | State that enumerated status and knowledge mens rea render it a crime of violence without residual-clause analysis. | Not necessary; enumerated aggravated assault satisfies 4B1.2(a)(1) with knowing, intentional conduct. |
| Does provocation element affect classification of Ohio aggravated assault as crime of violence? | Rodriguez: provocation negates purposeful/violent conduct. | Ohio provocation does not remove knowing/intent requirement; statute qualifies. | Provocation does not defeat enumerated crime-of-violence status; statute remains qualifying. |
Key Cases Cited
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (limits residual-clause analysis; relevance explained but not controlling where enumerated crime applies)
- United States v. Wood, 209 F.3d 847 (6th Cir. 2000) (enumerated crimes and residual clause framework for 4B1.2 analysis)
- United States v. Calloway, 189 Fed.Appx. 486 (6th Cir. 2006) (Ohio aggravated assault treated as crime of violence for career offender purposes)
- Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) (limits collateral attack on state convictions in federal sentencing)
- Aguilar-Diaz, 626 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 2010) (applies Custis to sentencing guidelines collateral-review context)
- United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (mens rea concepts applicable to determining violence)
- United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2011) (de novo review for crime-of-violence determination where plain error not argued)
- United States v. Wynn, 579 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (plain-error standard not applied where government did not request)
- United States v. McMurray, 653 F.3d 367 (6th Cir. 2011) (Begay analysis applied to career-offender context)
- State v. Murnahan, 1980 WL 354050 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) (provocation-related elements in aggravated assault context)