United States v. Rodney Class, 930 F.3d 460

Background

Rodney Class parked in a permit-only spot on the 200 block of Maryland Ave SW (about 1,000 feet from the Capitol) and left three firearms in his locked car; officers discovered the guns when Class returned.
Class was indicted under 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) for possessing firearms on Capitol Grounds, pleaded guilty, then appealed constitutional and statutory challenges.
This court initially upheld waiver of appeal; the Supreme Court reversed, holding Class could pursue constitutional challenges that attack the Government’s power to criminalize his conduct.
On remand the D.C. Circuit reviews two issues de novo: (1) whether the Capitol Grounds firearms ban, as applied to the Maryland Ave lot, violates the Second Amendment; and (2) whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fifth Amendment due-process guarantee.
The court treats the Maryland Ave lot as integrated with the Capitol (government-owned, reserved for House employees, near the Capitol) and so a “sensitive place” for Second Amendment purposes.
The court rejects Class’s vagueness/due-process claim, concluding the statutory boundaries are ascertainable (by map and public law), and that the statute gives fair notice even though signage is limited and the statute lacks an express scienter element.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 5104(e) as applied to the Maryland Ave parking lot violates the Second Amendment	Class: The lot is outdoors and not a government building, so Heller’s "sensitive places" presumption doesn’t apply; the ban meaningfully burdens his right to carry for self-defense	Government: The lot is part of Capitol Grounds, owned/controlled by Congress, reserved for employees, adjacent to the Capitol, and thus a "sensitive place" where bans are presumptively lawful	Held: The lot is sufficiently integrated with the Capitol; the ban does not impinge a protected right and survives (no further scrutiny reached)
Whether the Capitol Grounds ban is a "longstanding" regulation for Heller purposes	Class: The expansion to include Maryland Ave occurred in 1980, so the local restriction is not of "longstanding" vintage	Government: Heller’s inquiry is categorical (types of places); a new addition to a longstanding category (government grounds) is still covered	Held: Relevant inquiry is whether the type of regulation is longstanding; extension to this lot does not defeat the presumption of lawfulness
Whether the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process because boundaries are hard to determine	Class: Boundaries require consulting the U.S. Code, a 1946 map, then later public laws; lack of signage makes it unrealistic for ordinary people to know they are on Capitol Grounds	Government: Statute and public laws were enacted and published; street names and public maps identify the area; GPO appendices track changes	Held: No unconstitutional vagueness; statute provides fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence despite some complexity
Whether the absence of an explicit scienter requirement renders the statute constitutionally defective	Class: Lack of scienter (knowledge of being on Grounds) exacerbates notice problems and raises due-process concerns	Government: District court interpreted scienter to apply to possession of firearm; statutory-construction challenges waived on appeal	Held: The court applied a more searching vagueness standard (because criminal penalties, rights implicated, and lack of scienter) but still found the statute sufficiently clear; statutory-scienter arguments were waived

Key Cases Cited

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (recognizing Second Amendment right and noting presumptively lawful restrictions in "sensitive places")
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir.) (test for whether regulation impinges Second Amendment right)
Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir.) (right to carry outside the home but bans in small sensitive pockets are lightly burdensome)
Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (statutory scienter requirements in firearm-possession offenses implicate criminal- liability construction)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (vagueness doctrine: criminal statutes must give fair notice and avoid arbitrary enforcement)
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (heightened vagueness scrutiny where criminal penalties, protected rights, and lack of scienter are present)
Jeanette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of the Capitol Police, 421 F.2d 1090 (Capitol is an especially sensitive government location)