United States v. Robinson, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1

Defendant Ivan L. Robinson, a licensed nurse practitioner in D.C., was charged in a Superseding Indictment with 61 counts of distributing oxycodone by writing prescriptions allegedly outside the usual course of professional practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose (21 U.S.C. § 841), plus money laundering counts.
Robinson moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) to dismiss the Superseding Indictment as unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.
The legal question focuses on whether the CSA’s prohibition (as construed by regulation 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04) gives adequate notice to practitioners that prescribing conduct can be criminal when not for a legitimate medical purpose and outside the usual course of professional practice.
The government relied on longstanding precedent that health-care providers may be prosecuted under § 841 when prescriptions fall outside professional norms; it also proffered an expert (Dr. Mark Romanoff) to testify about medical standards.
The Court reviewed the motion to dismiss (distinct from the separate pending motion to exclude the government’s expert) and numerous persuasive out-of-circuit authorities rejecting vagueness challenges in similar contexts.
The Court denied Robinson’s motion, holding § 841 is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; challenges to the government’s expert are irrelevant to the vagueness inquiry and will be resolved separately.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 21 U.S.C. § 841 is unconstitutionally vague as applied to a prescribing practitioner	Government: § 841 plus § 1306.04 give objective standards and adequate notice that prescribing outside legitimate medical purpose/usual professional practice is criminal	Robinson: statutory phrases ("legitimate medical purpose", "usual course of practice") are vague; Gonzales v. Oregon narrows § 841 to traditional "drug dealer" conduct; expert testimony fails to define standards	Denied — § 841 is not vague as applied; the regulatory framework and case law provide adequate notice; Gonzales does not change the standard; expert issues are for separate resolution

United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (establishes physicians can be prosecuted under § 841 when activities fall outside usual professional practice)
Lanier v. United States, 520 U.S. 259 (vagueness doctrine: statute must make it reasonably clear conduct is criminal)
Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (classic statement of vagueness standard)
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (addressed CSA and physician-assisted suicide; did not alter § 841 usual-practice standard)
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (statute must provide adequate notice to persons of ordinary intelligence)
National Association of Manufacturers v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (reciting notice principle under vagueness analysis)
United States v. Rosenberg, 515 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.) (rejected vagueness challenge to "course of professional practice")
United States v. Collier, 478 F.2d 268 (5th Cir.) (rejecting § 841 vagueness as applied to physicians)
United States v. Kanner, 603 F.3d 530 (8th Cir.) (post-Gonzales rejection of argument that § 841 only covers conventional drug dealing)
United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.) (affirming that knowingly distributing prescriptions outside professional practice suffices for conviction)