United States v. Robin Riley, Jr., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16516

Background

In 1997 Riley pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 53.17 grams of crack cocaine and was sentenced to 262 months under the career-offender guideline (U.S.S.G. §4B1.1) after his plea agreement recommended a base offense level tied to §4B1.1.
At sentencing Riley unsuccessfully challenged career-offender status; his adjusted offense level was 34 and criminal-history category VI, yielding a 262–327 month guideline range; court imposed 262 months.
The Fair Sentencing Act and U.S.S.G. Amendment 750 later reduced the §2D1.1 drug-quantity ranges (lowering many crack sentences), and Amendment 750 was made retroactive.
Riley moved under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) for a sentence reduction to 120 months, arguing his original sentence was “based on” §2D1.1 and thus affected by Amendment 750.
The district court denied relief, concluding Riley’s sentence was based on the career-offender §4B1.1 range (unchanged by Amendment 750); Riley appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Riley’s sentence was “based on” a guideline range later lowered by the Sentencing Commission, making him eligible under §3582(c)(2)	Riley: Sentence at least partly based on §2D1.1 (drug-quantity) so Amendment 750 could reduce his term	Government: Sentence was based solely on §4B1.1 (career-offender), which Amendment 750 did not change	Held: Sentence was not based on §2D1.1; Riley is ineligible for §3582(c)(2) relief
Whether Freeman alters the definition of “based on” to broaden §3582(c)(2) eligibility	Riley: Freeman’s plurality supports a broader “based on” inquiry capturing any guideline consideration	Government: Freeman does not broaden rule; controlling concurrence is narrow and requires an express reliance on the guideline to base the term	Held: Freeman’s controlling concurrence (Sotomayor) is narrow; Riley’s plea did not reference §2D1.1, so Freeman does not help him
Whether Jackson requires remand or relief here	Riley: Cites Jackson to argue sentencing court’s policy remarks or below-§4B1.1 sentence can render sentence “based on” §2D1.1	Government: Jackson’s unusual procedural posture makes it inapplicable; Riley’s case differs	Held: Jackson is distinguishable (unique facts and timing); not controlling here
Whether the court must address retroactivity of the FSA for §3582(c)(2) purposes	Riley: Argues FSA should apply retroactively to sentence-reduction proceedings	Government: Contends not necessary to reach retroactivity because Riley is ineligible on other grounds	Held: Court declines to decide retroactivity because Riley is ineligible regardless

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Perdue, 572 F.3d 288 (6th Cir.) (career-offender sentences are not eligible for §3582(c)(2) reductions based on §2D1.1 amendments)
United States v. Moore, 582 F.3d 641 (6th Cir.) (standard of review for §3582(c)(2) denials)
United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d 323 (6th Cir.) (de novo review when district court concludes it lacks authority under §3582(c)(2))
United States v. Hameed, 614 F.3d 259 (6th Cir.) (an amendment must lower the defendant’s applicable guideline range to permit §3582(c)(2) relief; preliminary §2D1.1 calculation alone is insufficient)
United States v. Pembrook, 609 F.3d 381 (6th Cir.) (clarifying consistency requirement with Sentencing Commission policy statements for §3582(c)(2))
United States v. Sheldon Williams, 607 F.3d 1123 (6th Cir.) (career-offender sentence not ‘‘based on’’ amended §2D1.1 for §3582(c)(2) relief)
United States v. Freeman, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011) (plurality and narrow concurrence on when a sentence is “based on” a guideline for §3582(c)(2); Sotomayor concurrence limits relief to express reliance on a guideline)
United States v. Jackson, 678 F.3d 442 (6th Cir.) (distinct procedural posture where district court varied below §4B1.1 and expressly relied on §2D1.1; remand warranted there)
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (doctrine for determining the holding of fragmented Supreme Court decisions)