United States v. Robin Dwane Schaffer, Jr.
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6618
| 8th Cir. | 2016Background
- Robin Schaffer pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- At sentencing the Government argued Schaffer qualified as an Armed Career Criminal (ACCA) based on three prior violent felony convictions; the court applied an ACCA enhancement and imposed a 180-month sentence.
- Schaffer conceded two prior convictions counted but disputed that his prior felony domestic assault conviction under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) was a "violent felony" under the ACCA.
- The district court applied the modified categorical approach and found Schaffer was convicted under subdivision 1(1) (an act with intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death) and treated it as a violent felony under the ACCA force clause, relying on United States v. Salido-Rosas.
- The Eighth Circuit reviewed de novo whether Schaffer’s conviction satisfied the ACCA force clause (use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force) and affirmed the enhancement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether felony domestic assault under Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1) is a "violent felony" under the ACCA force clause | Schaffer: the statute requires only intent to cause fear, not proof the victim was actually placed in fear, so it may not involve threatened physical force | Government/District Court: the statute's element of intent to cause fear of immediate bodily harm constitutes a threatened use of physical force | The Eighth Circuit held the conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA force clause |
| Whether the victim's mental state matters to the force-clause analysis | Schaffer: victim’s actual fear distinguishes the statute from Salido-Rosas and matters to force analysis | Government: victim's mental state is irrelevant; a communicated threat suffices as threatened physical force | Court: victim's mental state is not the proper focus; a threat is a communicated intent to inflict harm and suffices |
| Whether the statute could cover non-violent means (e.g., exposing someone to a virus) and thus fall outside the force clause | Schaffer: conviction could rest on non-violent acts that do not use violent physical force | Government: such arguments were addressed by precedent and do not undermine classification as violent | Court: rejected speculative non-violent examples and relied on precedent (Salido-Rosas, Castleman) to affirm classification |
| Whether Salido-Rosas controls | Schaffer: Salido-Rosas is distinguishable due to differences in victim knowledge requirement | Government/District Court: offenses are materially similar; Salido-Rosas applies | Court: Salido-Rosas is not meaningfully distinguishable and controls; conviction qualifies as violent felony |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Salido-Rosas, 662 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding knowingly placing another in fear of imminent bodily harm qualifies as a crime of violence under a force clause)
- United States v. Soileau, 686 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2012) (describing categorical and modified categorical approaches for prior-offense analysis)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defining "physical force" as violent force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
- United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014) (explaining that certain non-obvious physical acts may still involve use of physical force when intended to cause physical harm)