United States v. Robert Maday, 799 F.3d 776

Background

Robert Maday committed multiple related federal and state offenses (bank robberies, escape while in state custody via writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, carjackings, and firearms offenses) in late 2008–2009 and was prosecuted in separate federal proceedings before Judges Gettleman and Castillo and in state court.
Before sentencing in the federal matters, state courts imposed lengthy sentences (13 years for certain robberies; 30 years for carjackings); Illinois day-for-day credit and crediting his custody time reduced effective overlap between nominal terms.
Judge Gettleman sentenced Maday (for three bank robberies) to 30 years, made that federal sentence consecutive to Maday’s 30‑year state sentence, and concurrent with a 13‑year state term; Maday appealed only the Gettleman sentence.
Judge Castillo sentenced Maday (for bank robbery, escape, and §924(c) firearm convictions) to an aggregate federal term reflecting statutory minimums for an armed career criminal and consecutive §924(c) terms, but mistakenly ordered portions to run concurrently with state time and with the armed‑career‑criminal term.
The Seventh Circuit held that Castillo erred by directing §924(c) sentences to run concurrently with other terms (forbidden by precedent) and by making certain §924(c) components concurrent with the armed‑career‑criminal term; but because the government did not cross‑appeal, the Castillo sentence stands as imposed.
The Seventh Circuit vacated Gettleman’s 30‑year sentence and remanded for resentencing because the judge failed adequately to consider and explain the §3553(a) factors (e.g., history/characteristics, proportionality, necessity) and did not account for overlapping related federal sentences handled by another judge.

Issues

Issue	Maday's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Judge Castillo could order §924(c) terms to run concurrently with other terms	Castillo’s concurrency orders violated §924(c) and produced an unlawful sentence	Government did not cross‑appeal the Castillo sentence	Court: Castillo erred under precedent forbidding concurrency, but sentence stands because no government cross‑appeal was filed (Greenlaw)
Whether Castillo could make §924(c) terms concurrent with the armed‑career‑criminal term	Same: such concurrency is barred by §924(c)(1)(D) and precedent	Govt did not cross‑appeal	Court: Concurrency is impermissible (Abbott/Taylor reasoning), but not vacated due to absence of cross‑appeal
Whether Judge Gettleman adequately applied and explained the §3553(a) sentencing factors in imposing 30 years consecutive to state time	Gettleman failed to justify a sentence greater than necessary; did not meaningfully consider defendant’s history, age, risk, and overlapping federal §924(c) mandatory minimums	Sentence within guidelines, emphasizes seriousness and deterrence	Court: Gettleman’s explanation was inadequate; sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing to ensure proper §3553(a) analysis
Whether both related federal prosecutions should have been handled by the same judge or coordinated sentencing	Maday contends the split proceedings produced inconsistent sequencing and inadequate aggregate sentencing consideration	Government did not justify separate sentencing coordination	Court: Criticized the split assignment as creating confusion; remand directs fresh sentencing consideration in light of overlapping federal exposure

Key Cases Cited

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (procedure for counsel’s motion to withdraw when appeal is frivolous)
Gonzales v. Duenas‑Alvarez, 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (§924(c) forbids directing §924(c) terms to run concurrently with any other term)
Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008) (appellate court may not increase sentence absent government cross‑appeal)
Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010) (§924(c)(1)(D) bars concurrent service of §924(c) terms with other imprisonment terms)
Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474 (2010) (calculation of federal good‑time credits affects effective sentence length)