United States v. Robert Hill
776 F.3d 243
| 4th Cir. | 2015Background
- In Feb. 2013 officers executed an arrest warrant for Eric Barker at a two-story house; Barker and two others (Dunigan, Hill) — both on supervised release — were found and arrested after a protective sweep.
- The defendants’ standard supervision condition required them to notify probation of moves and to permit probation officers to visit at any time and confiscate contraband in plain view; it did not expressly authorize warrantless searches.
- After the protective sweep, officers conducted a warrantless walk-through of the apartment looking for evidence of supervised-release violations and seized some items in plain view.
- A drug-detection dog arrived ~15–20 minutes later, performed a warrantless sniff inside the residence and alerted; officers found contraband in a ceiling tile.
- Using information gathered (including the dog alerts and items found), officers obtained a search warrant and executed it, recovering large quantities of drugs and paraphernalia.
- Defendants moved to suppress; the district court denied suppression applying a reasonable-suspicion standard under Knights; defendants pleaded guilty conditionally and appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers needed a warrant after the protective sweep to conduct a walk-through and dog sniff of a supervised-release residence | Walk-through and dog sniff were searches requiring a warrant because supervision conditions did not authorize warrantless searches | Supervision condition diminished privacy so only reasonable suspicion (Knights) was required | Court held Bradley controls; absent an express warrantless-search condition officers needed a warrant; walk-through and dog sniff were unlawful searches |
| Whether good-faith reliance on pre-Jardines precedent saves dog-sniff evidence from exclusion | N/A (Gov’t argument) | Officers reasonably relied on pre-Jardines precedent treating dog sniffs as not searches | Court held Davis exception did not apply: no binding precedent authorized a warrantless dog sniff inside a home |
| Whether the independent-source doctrine validates the later warrant-based search and its fruits | N/A (Gov’t argument) | The later warrant was independent because sufficient untainted evidence supported probable cause | Court vacated and remanded for district court to apply both Murray prongs (officer’s decision to seek warrant and magistrate’s decision to issue it) because the record leaves open whether illegal searches prompted the decision to seek the warrant |
| Whether district court properly applied Karo to excise tainted information and still find probable cause | N/A | District court relied on Karo and Allen to conclude the warrant would have issued absent taint | Court held Karo was distinguishable and remanded for factfinding under Murray because officers sought the warrant after the illegal searches |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978) (parolee’s consent to visits did not eliminate the warrant requirement for home searches)
- United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probationer who agreed to an express warrantless-search condition: reasonable suspicion suffices)
- Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (upheld warrantless searches under a state regulation for supervision under "special needs")
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (suspicionless searches permissible where parole condition clearly and unambiguously authorized them)
- Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013) (dog sniff at home is a Fourth Amendment search)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good-faith reliance on binding appellate precedent can defeat exclusionary rule)
- Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (independent-source doctrine requires that unlawful search not affect officers’ decision to seek a warrant or magistrate’s decision to issue it)
- United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (distinguishing warrant needs for beeper installation vs. monitoring; permits excision of tainted information when sufficient untainted facts support probable cause)
- United States v. Jeffus, 22 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 1994) (dog sniff of vehicle exterior in public place held not a search)
- United States v. Whitehead, 849 F.2d 849 (4th Cir. 1988) (dog sniff in train compartment required reasonable suspicion; Place did not sanction blanket use of dogs)
- United States v. Bullard, 645 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (discusses application of Murray independent-source analysis)