754 F.3d 258
4th Cir.2014Background
- Robert Earl Hairston pled guilty in 2003 to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics; the PSR used a 1991 North Carolina "No Operator’s License" conviction to place him in Criminal History Category IV and a Guidelines range of 324–405 months.
- Hairston objected to inclusion of the 1991 conviction at sentencing but could not disprove it; the district court adopted the PSR and sentenced him (sentence later reduced due to Guidelines amendments and other proceedings).
- Hairston filed a § 2255 motion within a year after sentencing raising other constitutional claims; that motion was denied. He continued pursuing state-court relief to vacate the 1991 conviction.
- In 2011 a North Carolina state court vacated the No Operator’s License conviction for lack of counsel; Hairston then filed a second § 2255 motion seeking resentencing based on a reduced criminal history category and lower Guidelines range.
- The district court dismissed the second § 2255 motion as an unauthorized "second or successive" petition under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A) and 2255(h); Hairston obtained a COA on whether his numerically second motion was in fact second or successive.
- The Fourth Circuit held Hairston’s motion was not "second or successive" because the factual predicate (vacatur of the state conviction) did not exist when his first § 2255 was filed and adjudicated; it reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hairston’s numerically second § 2255 motion is a “second or successive” petition under § 2255(h) | Hairston: motion is not successive because the vacatur of the state conviction (the basis for resentencing) occurred after and thus did not exist at the time of his first § 2255 motion | Government: the second motion is successive and requires court of appeals certification under § 2244/2255(h) | Court: Not successive where the facts giving rise to the claim did not exist when the first motion was filed and adjudicated; reversed and remanded |
| Whether the Government may rely on a plea waiver to bar Hairston’s § 2255 motion | Hairston: plea-waiver argument was forfeited because Government did not raise it in its appellate brief | Government: argued waiver should bar relief (but did not timely press the argument) | Court: Government waived the plea-waiver defense by failing to raise it in its informal brief; court enforces forfeiture |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (Supreme Court 2005) (vacatur of state conviction constitutes a new fact for § 2255 statute-of-limitations purposes)
- Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011) (second § 2255 motion based on state-court vacatur not treated as successive when claim was unripe at first petition)
- In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2013) (same conclusion as Stewart)
- In re Williams, 444 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2006) (not every numerically second petition is "second or successive")
- Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (Supreme Court 2007) (a claim unripe at time of initial petition may avoid § 2244(b) restrictions)
- In re Taylor, 171 F.3d 185 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowed numerically second § 2255 motion when claim arose after first motion)
- Obeid v. United States, 707 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2013) (joins other circuits concluding claims that were not ripe earlier are not "second or successive")
