United States v. Robert Doggart
947 F.3d 879
| 6th Cir. | 2020Background
- Robert Doggart (age 65) posted threats and solicited others to attack "Islamberg," including plans to burn the mosque using Molotovs/explosives; FBI used a confidential informant and arrested him after meetings where he showed maps and firearms.
- Doggart first agreed to a plea to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (interstate threats) with a 5-year cap, but the district court rejected the plea for lack of a factual basis (true-threat standard).
- After retrial he was indicted and convicted of two counts of solicitation (18 U.S.C. § 373): solicitation to damage religious property (18 U.S.C. § 247) and solicitation to commit federal arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)); two § 844(e) telephone-threat counts were later dismissed by the district court.
- On prior appeal this Court held the district court applied the wrong legal standard for "true threats" and ordered that if the court found Doggart intended to threaten, it must allow him to accept the plea agreement.
- On remand the district court found Doggart intended to threaten but declined to accept the Rule 11(c)(1)(A) plea as insufficiently serious; the jury convictions remained and the district court imposed consecutive sentences (120 months §247; 115 months §844(i)).
- This appeal challenges (1) the district court’s refusal to accept the plea, (2) whether the mosque qualified as a building "used in" interstate commerce under §844(i), (3) whether the §247 conviction is a crime of violence under §373, and (4) sentencing (remand requested).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Doggart) | Defendant's Argument (United States) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by refusing to accept the plea deal the appellate court ordered the court to allow | Court’s prior instruction required the court to let Doggart accept the plea if it found intent to threaten; refusal thwarted that mandate | District court retained Rule 11(c)(1)(A) authority to reject a plea that fails to reflect offense seriousness | No abuse of discretion — district court may independently evaluate and reject a Rule 11(c)(1)(A) plea |
| Whether the mosque was "used in" interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (arson solicitation) | Mosque’s planned bookstore and occasional summer-camp religious use suffice to show active use in interstate commerce | These activities were de minimis, speculative, or not sufficiently commercial or occurring at time of offense | Reversed conviction under §844(i): government failed to prove mosque was "used in" interstate commerce |
| Whether §247(d)(3) (destroying religious property by fire, explosives, or dangerous weapon) is a "crime of violence" under the solicitation statute (18 U.S.C. §373) | §247(d)(3) is divisible and might be satisfied absent physical-force element; thus not necessarily a crime of violence | Use of dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire necessarily involves physical force and so qualifies as a crime of violence | Affirmed: §247(d)(3) includes the use/attempted use of physical force (fire/weapons) and qualifies as a crime of violence |
| Sentencing — whether reversal of one solicitation conviction requires resentencing | Original sentencing package (both counts) produced Guidelines range; reversal may alter guideline calculation | Government argues sentencing decision stands or court can re-evaluate | Vacated and remanded for resentencing to allow district court to re-evaluate sentence without the §844(i) conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (construed §844(i) to require current, active commercial use and limited federal reach over ordinary local arsons)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (modified categorical approach for divisible statutes)
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (definition of "physical force" and categorical approach context)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (use of charging documents and jury instructions to determine which statutory phrase formed conviction)
- United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014) (indirect use of force counts for categorical/elemental analysis)
- United States v. Rayborn, 312 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 2002) (church operating interstate radio broadcasts sufficed as building used in interstate commerce)
- United States v. Rea, 300 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding a building being a church, without more, does not show use in interstate commerce)