United States v. Robert Doggart, 906 F.3d 506

Robert Doggart, a Tennessee resident, posted on Facebook and recruited others to attack Islamberg, a Muslim community in New York, expressing plans to burn buildings and kill residents.
An FBI confidential informant responded, spoke with Doggart by phone and met him; Doggart showed weapons and discussed burning Islamberg’s buildings.
Doggart was arrested and initially charged with transmitting a threat in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c); he agreed to plead guilty under a plea deal that carried a maximum of 5 years.
The district court rejected the plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3), concluding the admitted statements did not constitute an objective threat.
The government later indicted and tried Doggart on solicitation and additional threat charges; a jury convicted him of solicitation to damage religious property and solicitation to commit arson, resulting in a 235‑month sentence; the district court granted acquittal on the threat counts.
Doggart appealed, arguing the district court abused its discretion by misreading the threat statute and improperly rejecting his plea agreement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court properly rejected Doggart’s plea because his admitted statements were not an objective threat under § 875(c)	Doggart argued the admitted conduct (statements to kill and burn Islamberg) met § 875(c): interstate communication, would be viewed as a threat by a reasonable observer, and he intended it as a threat	Government (and district court) contended the statements were not an objective threat under the circuit’s prior gloss (Alkhabaz) requiring that the words aim to effect change via intimidation	Reversed: district court misapplied the law. Under governing law (including Elonis), Doggart’s statements objectively qualified as a threat; district court must reconsider plea focusing on whether Doggart subjectively intended the statements as threats

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (principle that courts should give sound reason when refusing plea agreements)
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (legal error by a court can constitute abuse of discretion)
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (Rule 11 factual-basis requirement)
Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015) (threat statute requires proof that defendant intended the communication to be a threat)
United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 2012) (elements of § 875(c) articulated)
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) (prior circuit decision suggesting an ‘‘intimidation’’/goal requirement for threats)
United States v. Rea-Beltran, 457 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 2006) (remedy for wrongful rejection of a plea is reinstatement when prejudice exists)