United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166

Rivera was convicted of a crack cocaine offense in 1996 and sentenced to 292 months.
The offense involved approximately 3.3 kilograms of crack; base offense level initially 38 under pre-2011 guidelines.
As a career offender under § 4B1.1, Rivera faced CHC VI with a range of 360 months to life, but the court departed downward to 292–365 months due to mental-condition- based mitigation.
The district court later denied Rivera’s 3582(c)(2) motion for retroactive crack guideline reductions, ruling he was not eligible because his range had not been lowered.
The Second Circuit held Rivera eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction and remanded for determination of the actual reduction, clarifying the proper “applicable range” and the effect of retroactive amendments.
The court discussed the interaction between 3582(c)(2), U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and the 2007 crack amendments, and recognized the justice of retroactive relief to address past disparities.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rivera was eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).	Rivera argues the post-departure range lowered by the retroactive crack amendment should govern.	The government contends the career-offender range (not lowered) governs eligibility.	Yes; Rivera is eligible for a reduction.
What constitutes the 'applicable guideline range' for § 3582(c)(2) in Rivera’s context.	The applicable range is the post-departure range produced by the judge’s three-level departure.	The applicable range remains the career-offender range not lowered by the amendment.	The post-departure range is the applicable range for § 1B1.10 purposes.
Whether the court should apply the plain-language reading of § 3582(c)(2) and 1B1.10 or defer to sister circuits.	A broad reading should permit retroactive relief to address injustices from the old crack guideline.	Some circuits construe narrowly, limiting relief when the amendment does not lower the defendant’s applicable range.	The court adopts a broad reading, aligning with McGee and Freeman to permit relief.
What is the proper interpretive approach given the interaction of statutes and guidelines in this context.	The combination of § 3582(c)(2) and § 1B1.10 should be read in pari materia to avoid arbitrary outcomes.	Guidelines interpretation should be rigid, avoiding departures influencing eligibility.	Read in pari materia; isolation of the marginal effect supports relief.

Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685 (2011) (retroactivity to fix inequality in crack sentences; plurality view)
McGee v. United States, 553 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2009) (eligibility where post-departure range lowered by retroactive amendment)
Martinez v. United States, 572 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2009) (guideline range calculus; 'based on' interpretation)
Darton v. United States, 595 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2010) (split on 'based on' and applicability of 1B1.10)
Tolliver v. United States, 570 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2009) (precedent on departures and applicability of prior ranges)
Pembrook v. United States, 609 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2010) (conflicted circuit approach to § 3582(c)(2) eligibility)