37 F.4th 622
9th Cir.2022Background
- In 1990 Mathews placed an explosive device in an alley that detonated and seriously injured an innocent bystander; he was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (explosive property damage) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (using/carrying a firearm/explosive during a crime of violence).
- An explosive counts as a “firearm” under § 924(c), and using an explosive under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) carried a mandatory consecutive 30-year term; Mathews’s total sentence was 495 months, 360 months attributable to the § 924(c) count.
- After Johnson and then Davis invalidated similar residual clauses as unconstitutionally vague, Mathews filed a § 2255 motion arguing his § 924(c) conviction relied on § 924(c)(3)(B)’s now-void residual clause.
- The Government conceded that, under the categorical approach, Mathews’s § 844(i) conviction does not qualify as a § 924(c)(3)(A) crime of violence; the district court nonetheless denied relief, relying on a prior Ninth Circuit panel decision about congressional intent and declining to apply the categorical approach.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo, applied the categorical approach, concluded § 844(i) is not categorically a crime of violence because it can cover destruction of one’s own property, reversed the district court’s denial of § 2255 relief, and remanded to vacate the § 924(c) conviction and resentence.
Issues
| Issue | Mathews' Argument | Government/District Court Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a § 844(i) conviction qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3) after Davis | § 924(c) conviction rests on the residual clause; Davis voids that clause so § 924(c) conviction must be vacated | Argues § 844(i) is a crime of violence (district court relied on prior panel finding of Congressional intent) | § 844(i) is not categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A); § 924(c) conviction vacated |
| Whether the district court could rely on the earlier Ninth Circuit decision instead of applying the categorical approach | Categorical approach should be applied; prior panel intent findings do not negate categorical test | District court claimed it was bound by past panel’s view of congressional intent and therefore need not apply the categorical approach | Courts must apply the categorical approach; district court erred in refusing to apply it |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (Struck down § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (Held similar residual clause in ACCA void for vagueness)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (Explains and requires the categorical approach for comparing statutory elements)
- United States v. Mathews, 36 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1994) (Prior Ninth Circuit decision on double jeopardy and congressional intent relied on by district court)
