United States v. Richard Jackson
866 F.3d 982
8th Cir.2017Background
- Jackson, on supervised release for failure to register as a sex offender, was required to reside at a residential reentry facility and follow its rules, which he signed and that expressly allowed searches of items brought onto the premises.
- The Facility prohibited possession of cell phones inside the facility (phones could be stored in an entrance locker) and posted signs warning that property was subject to search.
- March 16: a probation officer confiscated Jackson’s phone after finding it in the facility, returned it without searching, and warned that a second violation would lead to confiscation and search.
- March 21: staff recovered Jackson’s phone in another resident’s possession; a residential officer confirmed ownership, obtained Jackson’s passcode, and examined the device, revealing pornographic material; a probation officer then searched further and found potentially underage material.
- Investigators later obtained a warrant and forensic exam revealed 37 images of child pornography; Jackson was charged with possession of child pornography and moved to suppress the evidence from the warrantless searches.
- The district court denied suppression (adopting a magistrate’s report that officers had reasonable suspicion); on appeal the court considered whether any suspicion was required and ruled Jackson lacked a legitimate privacy expectation in the phone, so the searches were permissible.
Issues
| Issue | Jackson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the warrantless search of Jackson’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment | Search required suspicion or a warrant under Riley; phone contents are highly private | No suspicion necessary because Jackson, as a supervised-release resident in a reentry facility, had a diminished expectation of privacy and was on notice that property was searchable | Held: No legitimate expectation of privacy; search reasonable without antecedent suspicion |
| Whether Riley v. California controls searches of cell phones in the supervised-release/reentry facility context | Riley’s warrant requirement for cell-phone searches should apply | Riley applied to arrestees, not to supervised-releasees in custodial-like programs with diminished privacy | Held: Riley not controlling given supervised-release context and facility rules |
Key Cases Cited
- Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (suspicionless searches of parolees reasonable given diminished privacy and substantial government interests)
- Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014) (generally requires a warrant to search cell-phone data incident to arrest)
- Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (supervised-release/parole is a form of criminal sanction and supports special search conditions)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (describing parole as conditional release subject to rules)
- United States v. Makeeff, 820 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2016) (supervised releasees have highly circumscribed expectations of privacy)
- United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing supervised release as punishment additional to incarceration)
- United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2013) (upholding search of a parolee/resident’s phone under diminished privacy expectations)
