United States v. Richard Eugene Young, Jr., 685 F. App'x 832

Richard Eugene Young, Jr. was convicted of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841) and (2) possession with intent to distribute cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841). He received a 293‑month sentence.
At trial undercover detectives purchased ~14 grams of cocaine in a controlled buy; witnesses testified Young participated in price renegotiation, handed the bag to the buyer, and vouched for its quality.
Young challenged prosecutorial remarks in closing: references to uncalled co‑conspirator Vashawn Thurston, an assertion that Thurston “introduced Young as the seller,” and statements about detectives’ credibility.
Young moved for judgment of acquittal arguing insufficient evidence for both conspiracy and possession convictions (contending mere presence or an isolated buy‑sell was insufficient).
At sentencing Young argued the 293‑month term was substantively unreasonable given his limited role and highlighted disparity with Thurston’s much lower sentence.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, rejecting Young’s challenges to closing argument, sufficiency of the evidence, and sentence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Confrontation Clause/prosecutor’s hypothetical about Thurston	Prosecutor improperly related statements of uncalled co‑conspirator (testimonial hearsay)	Statements were hypotheticals, non‑testimonial, and thus permissible	No plain error; prosecutor’s hypothetical not testimonial hearsay and not prejudicial
Prosecutorial misconduct/vouching and misstating evidence	Prosecutor overstated evidence (claimed Thurston introduced Young) and vouched for detectives’ credibility	Remarks were reasonable inferences from trial evidence and tracked court instructions and witnesses’ testimony	No plain error; remarks were permissible inference and did not impermissibly vouch
Sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy and possession	Convictions rested on mere presence or a single buy—insufficient for conspiracy or possession	Evidence showed active participation: price renegotiation, handing cocaine to buyer, assuring quality—supporting both convictions	Convictions affirmed: reasonable juror could find knowing participation and possession with intent to distribute
Substantive reasonableness of 293‑month sentence	Sentence excessive given limited role and disparity with Thurston’s 27 months	District court considered §3553(a) factors, Young’s extensive criminal history, and guideline range; records differ so disparity not implicated	Sentence not substantively unreasonable: within guideline range, below statutory max, and adequately justified

United States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006) (plain‑error review when Confrontation Clause objection not timely)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (plain‑error standard)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial hearsay and Confrontation Clause)
United States v. Newton, 44 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1994) (plain‑error review of closing argument)
United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1997) (prosecutor may draw conclusions from evidence in closing)
United States v. Sims, 719 F.2d 375 (11th Cir. 1983) (prosecutorial vouching standards)
United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 1995) (presence/association alone insufficient, but probative)
United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2009) (elements of conspiracy conviction)
United States v. Capers, 708 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2013) (elements of possession with intent to distribute)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (abuse‑of‑discretion review of sentence reasonableness)