United States v. Richard Brown
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 7879
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Brown was charged with advertising, transporting, receiving, and possessing child pornography after investigators linked file-sharing activity to a computer at his home and found a shared FrostWire folder and hidden files on an external hard drive.
- Brown retained private counsel and paid a $50,000 retainer; two and a half weeks before trial counsel moved to withdraw and Brown sought appointment of the Federal Public Defender.
- At a hearing the district court focused on counsel’s competence, payment issues, and potential delay, conducted an ex parte portion, and denied Brown’s request to discharge retained counsel and to appoint replacement counsel. The court later continued trial by about a month; Brown was convicted and sentenced.
- On appeal Brown argued the district court wrongly denied his constitutional right to discharge retained counsel and failed to appoint CJA counsel; he also challenged sufficiency of the evidence.
- The Ninth Circuit held the district court misapplied the standard from Rivera-Corona, incorrectly treated the motion as one to replace appointed counsel, and therefore unlawfully denied Brown the right to discharge retained counsel and to receive appointed counsel under the CJA. The convictions were vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Brown) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a financially qualified defendant can discharge retained counsel and obtain appointed counsel without showing a conflict amounting to constructive denial of counsel | District court and government asserted the stricter "extent-of-conflict" standard (used for substitution among appointed counsel) should govern; timeliness, inquiry adequacy, and extent of conflict justify denial | Brown argued Rivera-Corona entitles a defendant to discharge retained counsel for any reason (subject only to orderly-administration limits) and, if indigent, to appointment under §3006A(b) | Held for Brown: Rivera-Corona controls; defendant may fire retained counsel for any reason unless denial is compelled by fair, efficient, orderly administration of justice; district court abused discretion and should have appointed counsel |
| Whether §3006A(b) requires appointment of counsel after retained counsel is discharged | Government argued appointment should be governed by Martel factors (timeliness, inquiry, cause/conflict) akin to extent-of-conflict review | Brown argued CJA §3006A(b) mandates appointment if financially unable to retain counsel and not waiving counsel, once retained counsel is discharged | Held for Brown: §3006A(b) applies and requires appointment absent an intelligent waiver of counsel; the government’s proposed restrictive standard would undermine constitutional rights |
| Whether district court denial was justified by court calendar concerns and potential delay | Government suggested timing and disruption justified denial | Brown argued court could and did offer continuance; no record showing undue delay or inquiry into how much time new counsel would need | Held for Brown: court did not base denial on calendar concerns and offered a continuance; timing did not justify refusal to allow discharge and appoint counsel |
| Sufficiency of evidence to support transportation conviction (and others) | Government contended FrostWire shared-folder setup and Brown’s technical control sufficed to prove transportation/advertising under amended statutes and Mohrbacher analogues | Brown argued mere availability/shared folder does not prove "transportation"; attack on whether material crossed state lines (pre-amendment case law) | Held for government on sufficiency (district court error remedied by vacatur on counsel issue): appellate court found evidence sufficient to support transportation given Brown’s business, designated shared folder, and technical role; statutory amendments remove need to show crossing state lines |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2010) (defendant may discharge retained counsel for any reason except where denial is compelled by fair, efficient, orderly administration of justice)
- United States v. Ensign, 491 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (limits on choice-of-counsel right tied to administration of justice)
- Gonzalez-Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (right to counsel of choice is distinct and its denial is structural error)
- Martel v. Clair, 132 S. Ct. 1276 (2012) (interpreting standards for substitution/appointment in capital habeas context and limits of court discretion)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant may waive counsel and proceed pro se only if waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent)
- Mohrbacher v. United States, 182 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (distinguishing downloaders from operators regarding "transporting" child pornography)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants)