United States v. Richard A. Chafin
808 F.3d 1263
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- Richard Chafin, longtime Brooks County Sheriff, was tried and convicted after 225 checks totaling $65,730 from the jail commissary account were made payable to and cashed by him in 2007–2008.
- Chafin told department staff and a GBI agent the funds paid confidential informants; no supporting records or corroboration were found, and the purported primary informant left virtually no assets at death.
- Brooks County received federal grant funds from the Office for Victims of Crime in fiscal years overlapping 2007–2008; those grants funded part of a witness-advocate position and paid at least $25,000 of that salary each year.
- Chafin was convicted by bench trial of: (1) federal-program embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 666 and (2) obstructing the communication of information about a potential federal offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).
- On appeal the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the § 666 conviction (disputing whether § 666(c)’s bona fide salary exception reduces the § 666(b) federal-funds threshold) and vacated the § 1512(b)(3) conviction because the district court applied a now-rejected “possibility” standard rather than the Supreme Court’s “reasonable likelihood” standard.
Issues
| Issue | Chafin's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 666(c)’s “bona fide salary” exception applies to § 666(b)’s federal-funds threshold | § 666(c) says “this section,” so the salary exception applies to all of § 666, including the >$10,000 threshold | § 666(c) should not be read to exclude federal grant funds that constitute the covered entity’s benefits under a federal program | Court: § 666(c) applies to the whole statute, but when applied to § 666(b) it means to except bona fide salary paid by the federal government to the entity; funds that are federal grants to the county (even if used to pay salaries) count toward the threshold |
| Whether the specific witness-advocate salary grants are excluded from the >$10,000 calculation | The grant money used to pay the witness advocate is a bona fide salary and therefore must be excepted from the § 666(b) total | The grants are federal program benefits to the county, not federal salary payments to the county, so they count toward the § 666(b) threshold | Court: Grants to the county that fund a salary are not themselves salary payments from the federal government and therefore are counted for § 666(b); conviction under § 666 affirmed |
| Whether the district court applied the correct legal standard for § 1512(b)(3) (mens rea/causation to federal authorities) | District court applied Veal’s “possibility” standard (no challenge at trial) | Government relied on Veal/following Eleventh Circuit precedent | Court: Supreme Court’s Fowler decision replaced Veal’s possibility standard with a “reasonable likelihood” standard; district court’s use of Veal was plain error; § 1512(b)(3) conviction vacated |
| Whether evidence satisfied the Supreme Court’s "reasonable likelihood" standard for § 1512(b)(3) | Chafin’s misleading statements to a state agent could reasonably have been relayed to federal authorities | Government presented no evidence that misleading statements to the GBI agent were reasonably likely to be communicated to federal authorities; GBI told Chafin the local DA had requested the investigation | Court: Government failed to show a reasonable likelihood of transmission to federal authorities; conviction vacated |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981 (11th Cir. 2012) (discusses § 666’s purpose and broad construction)
- United States v. Mills, 140 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 1998) (holds § 666(c) bona fide salary exception applies to entire § 666)
- United States v. Nichols, 40 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 1994) (interprets § 666(c) exclusion for agencies receiving federal funds only as bona fide salary)
- United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 1998) (previous panel held § 1512(b)(3) did not require knowing federal character; later superseded by Fowler)
- United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (treats limits on overruling prior panel precedent)
- United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 2011) (addresses whether § 666(c) precludes salary evidence for transactional element)