United States v. Reyes-Santiago
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16887
| 1st Cir. | 2015Background
- Reyes was one of 110 defendants in a large drug- and firearms-related conspiracy in Bayamón, Puerto Rico; he pleaded guilty under a non‑binding plea agreement that stipulated 2–3.5 kg of cocaine (Guidelines BOL 28) and anticipated a Guidelines range of 100–125 months given his CHC IV.
- The probation officer’s PSR attributed much larger drug quantities to Reyes (converted to 241,021 kg marijuana equivalent), yielding BOL 38 and a Guidelines range of 360 months to life; the district court adopted the PSR calculation, applied a 3‑level leadership enhancement, and sentenced Reyes to 360 months on the drug count.
- Many other high‑level co‑defendants pled to similar low quantity stipulations and received substantially lower sentences (chart in opinion shows Count One sentences ranging mostly 78–240 months; leader got 324 months).
- At sentencing the court ordered the government to produce a cooperating witness (Burgos) and heard Burgos’s testimony that Reyes was a manager at one housing project and a right‑hand to the leader; defense argued disparate treatment and that the court’s inquiry was influenced by Reyes’s prior state trial (Pájaros Massacre), which the court said it would not consider but acknowledged remained "still there."
- Reyes also faced a separate revocation sentence for violations of supervised release from a 2000 conviction; the district court imposed a consecutive 24‑month revocation term, which exceeded the statutory aggregate cap as applied to his prior revocations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) | Reyes acknowledged late filing but argued government waived/forfeited timeliness objection | Government moved to dismiss as untimely | Rule 4(b) is a claims‑processing rule that may be waived/forfeited; government waived/forfeited its timeliness challenge here |
| Sentencing disparity among co‑defendants (Count One) | Reyes: his 360‑month term is substantively unreasonable and procedurally defective because the court uniquely rejected his stipulation and attributed a far larger drug quantity without record support, producing an unjustified disparity | Government: district court permissibly found defendants not similarly situated and the court exercised discretion to reject stipulation | Vacated and remanded: court abused discretion by imposing a sentence that is substantively unreasonable due to an unexplained, unsupported disparity in drug‑quantity attribution versus similarly situated co‑defendants; resentencing required |
| Alleged government breach of plea agreement at sentencing | Reyes: government elicited Burgos’s testimony and objected to defense cross (undermining its commitment to the plea), failed to address disparity, and effectively sought enhancements beyond the bargain | Government: produced witness at court’s direction and maintained commitment to plea; disputed breach | Court declined to resolve breach claim fully because resentencing required; admonished government that it should have addressed disparity and been more circumspect in objecting to defense questioning on remand |
| Supervised release revocation term aggregation | Reyes: the 24‑month consecutive revocation term, when aggregated with prior revocation sentences, exceeded the statutory cap applicable at his original sentencing (36 months), so maximum remaining exposure was 21 months | Government: contended Guidelines calculation and choice of range justified 24 months; argued court could use then‑current Guidelines | Vacated: revocation sentence exceeded the statutory aggregate cap in effect at original sentencing; remand for revocation resentencing with proper statutory/GUIDELINES limits (max 21 months given prior revocations); court should consult correct revocation Guidelines range for CHC at original sentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gonzalez‑Rodriguez, 777 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.) (Rule 4(b) timeliness and consequences)
- Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (distinction between jurisdictional rules and claim‑processing rules)
- Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004) (claim‑processing rules may be forfeited if not timely raised)
- Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (distinguishing statute‑based jurisdictional time limits from court‑promulgated rules)
- United States v. Rapoport, 159 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (prior characterization of Rule 4(b) as jurisdictional)
- United States v. Saxena, 229 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.) (government’s dual duties at sentencing — honor plea and disclose relevant sentencing information)
- United States v. Gonczy, 357 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.) (standards for assessing government conduct re: plea agreement at sentencing)
- United States v. Tapia‑Escalera, 356 F.3d 181 (1st Cir.) (revocation sentencing governed by statutes/GUIDELINES in effect at original sentencing)