United States v. Reyes-Rivas, 909 F.3d 466

Background

Reyes pleaded guilty to assault with a dangerous weapon for stabbing a fellow inmate and proceeded to sentencing in the District of Puerto Rico.
The PSR classified Reyes as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior convictions: federal carjacking (2014) and Puerto Rico aggravated battery (2012).
The career-offender "crime of violence" definition then included a force clause, an enumerated-offenses clause, and a residual clause; application requires the categorical approach.
At sentencing the government submitted (but did not translate) a Spanish-language judgment of conviction for the aggravated battery; the District Court stated it "used" the untranslated document and concluded the prior conviction qualified as a crime of violence, making Reyes a career offender and yielding a 77-month sentence.
On appeal Reyes challenged both the career-offender enhancement (arguing his aggravated-battery conviction did not satisfy the force clause and the residual clause was unconstitutional per Johnson II) and the District Court's consideration of an untranslated Spanish document in violation of the Jones Act (48 U.S.C. § 864).
The First Circuit held there was a Jones Act violation, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing without consideration of the untranslated judgment; it limited the government on remand to arguments it preserved (chiefly the residual-clause argument the government advanced on appeal).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether use of an untranslated Spanish judgment at sentencing violated the Jones Act	Government effectively treated the untranslated document as part of the record and relied on it	Reyes argued the Jones Act requires English-language materials and the untranslated document tainted sentencing	Court: Jones Act violation occurred; sentence vacated and remanded without consideration of the untranslated document
Whether Reyes's Puerto Rico aggravated-battery conviction is a "crime of violence" under the Guidelines	Government (at sentencing) argued the conviction satisfied the force clause; on appeal it argued the conviction (as fourth-degree) could be a crime of violence under the residual clause (Beckles)	Reyes argued the offense did not have an element of force sufficient for the force clause and that Johnson II invalidated the residual clause (as applied)	Court: Did not resolve substantive predicate issue because the untranslated document prevented knowing which statutory variant Reyes was convicted of; remanded to determine offense variant and whether it qualifies, without permitting new evidence from the untranslated judgment
Whether the government may introduce the translated judgment on remand as new evidence	Government sought to supplement the record with a certified translation	Reyes opposed allowing new evidence; argued government had incentive to present English evidence at sentencing	Court: Government may not present new evidence of the prior conviction on remand; translation would be new evidence and thus excluded
Which version of the Guidelines applies on remand	N/A (procedural question)	N/A	Court: District Court must apply the Guidelines version in effect at the prior sentencing (including the residual clause), but may consider the Sentencing Commission's amendment removing the residual clause when appropriate

Key Cases Cited

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (categorical approach for prior offenses)
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (force-clause interpretation)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (residual-clause vagueness challenge)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (Guidelines' residual clause not void for vagueness)
United States v. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F.3d 1 (Jones Act English-language requirement)
United States v. Millán-Isaac, 749 F.3d 57 (Jones Act violation analysis)