United States v. Rex A. Hopper, 11 F.4th 561

Rex A. Hopper was convicted (March 2018 jury verdict) of conspiracy to distribute 50+ grams of a mixture containing methamphetamine; initially sentenced to 235 months.
On direct appeal (Hopper I), this Court found the district court had double‑counted drug quantities and vacated the sentence, remanding solely to recalculate relevant conduct (934 F.3d 740).
On remand the probation office reduced attributable quantity to 1.17 kg of "ice" methamphetamine and prepared a revised PSR; it also added one criminal history point for a 2018 state residential burglary conviction that occurred after the original federal sentencing but before remand.
Hopper filed pro se objections arguing the jury (not the judge) should have found drug purity/that the substance was "ice" and objected to judge‑found facts increasing his Guidelines; he did not object to the burglary point at the PSR stage but later challenged it on appeal.
The district court concluded the earlier remand was limited to correcting drug quantity and declined to relitigate drug type/purity; it accepted the 1.17 kg "ice" finding, counted the state burglary for one criminal history point, and reimposed 235 months.
Hopper appealed again; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the remand was limited to quantity and that including the intervening state conviction in criminal history was not plain error.

Issue	Hopper's Argument	Government/District Court's Argument	Held
Whether the district court could relitigate drug type/purity ("ice") on remand	Jury, not judge, must determine purity/type; purity raises Apprendi/Sixth Amendment issue and is part of relevant conduct	Remand in Hopper I was limited to correcting drug quantity (double‑counting); drug type was already decided and not within scope	Remand limited to quantity; district court properly declined to relitigate drug type/purity
Whether a state burglary conviction entered after the original federal sentence but before resentencing counts as a "prior sentence" for Guidelines criminal history	A "prior sentence" means a sentence imposed before the original (vacated) sentence; later sentences should not be counted	Sentencing is de novo on resentencing; intervening sentences imposed before resentencing may be considered and counted under the Guidelines	Counting the 2018 burglary sentence was not plain error; district court permissibly assessed one criminal history point

United States v. Hopper, 934 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2019) (earlier opinion vacating sentence for double‑counting and remanding to recalculate relevant conduct)
United States v. Carnell, 972 F.3d 932 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing proof required to establish drug "ice" purity for sentencing)
United States v. Uriarte, 975 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (framework for types/scope of remands)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009) (plain‑error standard requires error be clear or obvious)
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011) (district court on resentencing may consider post‑sentencing developments such as rehabilitation)
United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1999) (position that "prior sentence" excludes sentences imposed after the original sentence but before resentencing)
Olano v. United States, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (establishing plain‑error review criteria)