235 F. Supp. 3d 366
D.P.R.2017Background
- Defendant Iván Rentas-Félix was convicted in federal court, sentenced, and placed on supervised release with the condition that he not commit any federal, state, or local crime.
- On June 6, 2016 defendant was arrested in Puerto Rico and later charged with aggravated battery and use of a bladed weapon after an assault that required the victim’s hospitalization.
- A Puerto Rico court ultimately found no probable cause to indict the defendant at preliminary proceedings; the Commonwealth charges were thus dismissed to the point of indictment.
- The U.S. Probation Office initiated federal supervised-release revocation proceedings; the government sought revocation and maximum imprisonment, relying on the underlying conduct rather than a state conviction.
- At the federal revocation hearing the government presented victim and police testimony; defendant argued (1) discovery violations (Brady/Jencks/Rule 26.2) required excluding evidence, (2) the evidence was insufficient, and (3) Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle and double jeopardy precluded using the dismissed state charge conduct in revocation.
- The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant assaulted the victim (aggravated battery), denied exclusion for discovery violations, held Sánchez Valle/double jeopardy inapplicable to the revocation context, revoked supervised release, and reserved sentencing discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether undisclosed recording of victim’s prior state-court testimony required exclusion under Brady | Government: no suppression; recording produced later and defendant knew of testimony | Rentas: recording withheld before cross-examination; Brady/Giglio material withheld | Court: No Brady violation — defendant knew of testimony, no prejudice shown; testimony admitted |
| Whether Jencks Act / Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 required striking witness testimony for late production | Government: late production cured when produced; court reopened opportunity to recross and defendant declined | Rentas: late production deprived effective cross-examination and mandates exclusion | Court: No Jencks/Rule 26.2 relief — statements produced later, defendant offered but declined reopening, no prejudice |
| Sufficiency of evidence to revoke supervised release based on alleged state offense conduct | Government: testimony and medical evidence show assault and hospitalization; preponderance standard satisfied | Rentas: victim unreliable, intoxicated, and uncorroborated; insufficient proof defendant participated | Court: Preponderance met — victim and paramedic/police testimony corroborate assault and defendant’s participation |
| Effect of Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle / Double Jeopardy on revocation relying on conduct underlying dismissed state charge | Rentas: Sánchez Valle precludes use of conduct because state court found no probable cause to indict; double jeopardy protections apply | Government: Sánchez Valle/double jeopardy apply to prosecutions/trials, not to revocation proceedings; revocation looks to conduct | Court: Sánchez Valle and double jeopardy inapplicable — preliminary hearing is not a trial and jeopardy doesn’t attach; revocation is noncriminal and may consider conduct despite dismissed state charge |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (Double Jeopardy bars successive prosecutions by Puerto Rico and U.S. when sovereign interest is the same)
- Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions)
- United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (revocation may be based on underlying conduct despite dismissal of state charges)
- United States v. Portalla, 985 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1993) (preponderance standard applies to supervised-release revocation)
- United States v. Willis, 795 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2015) (revocation may rest on conduct constituting a crime even absent separate prosecution)
