United States v. Raymond Surratt, Jr.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 7005
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- Raymond Surratt pleaded guilty in 2005 to a crack-cocaine conspiracy; under then-governing precedent he received a mandatory life sentence based on prior state convictions.
- Subsequent developments changed the legal landscape: the Fair Sentencing Act (2010) reduced crack quantity thresholds, and this Court overruled the prior precedent in Simmons (2011), both of which apply retroactively and would materially lower Surratt’s exposure on resentencing.
- Surratt filed collateral relief petitions (§2241/§2255-savings-clause) arguing his life sentence was unlawful; the government later agreed he was entitled to relief but circuit rulings limited availability of the savings clause.
- While his en banc rehearing was pending, the President commuted Surratt’s life sentence to 200 months, conditioned on enrollment in RDAP; Surratt accepted the commutation.
- The Court sua sponte asked whether the commutation mooted Surratt’s pending collateral challenge; after briefing the court (lead opinion) dismissed the appeal as moot. Judge Wynn dissented, arguing the case is not moot and the court should vacate and remand for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Surratt) | Defendant's Argument (Government/Majority) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness after commutation | Case remains live because vacating the commuted sentence and remanding would likely produce a shorter sentence (possibly immediate release); Surratt retains concrete liberty interest | Commutation substitutes an executive sentence; federal courts cannot alter the effect of a presidential commutation; therefore the collateral challenge is moot | Majority: Dismissed as moot. Dissent: Not moot — retains concrete interest and relief is possible |
| Judicial power to review or alter commuted sentences | Courts may review collateral attacks where commutation does not eliminate judicial interest, and commutation can be constitutionally limited or tainted by prior unlawful sentence | Presidential pardon/commutation is plenary and closes the “judicial door” to relief altering that executive act | Majority: treated commutation as ending justiciability here; Dissent: courts retain power where commutation may be tainted or conditions unmet |
| Effect of accepting a conditional commutation on collateral rights | Acceptance was not an informed waiver of collateral-rights; the commutation did not expressly or knowingly require abandonment of pending collateral relief | Acceptance of commutation substitutes a lesser punishment and petitioner cannot complain after choosing it (citing Wells/Schick) | Held (majority): dismissed as moot (implicitly treating acceptance as ending the controversy). Dissent: acceptance did not knowingly waive collateral relief, so appeal not moot |
| Relevance of Schick and related precedent | Schick is distinguishable: Schick involved military sentence and commutation when no pending collateral claim; Surratt’s commutation occurred while his collateral challenge was live and after the sentence was already invalidated by circuit precedent | Schick endorses treating a commuted sentence as final in many post-commutation collateral contexts | Dissent: Schick is distinguishable and does not bar relief here; Majority relied on mootness outcome without extended Schick analysis |
Key Cases Cited
- Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974) (Supreme Court decision concerning limits on collateral attack after executive commutation)
- Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307 (1856) (discusses conditional commutations and acceptance)
- United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (overruled prior circuit test for treating state convictions as federal sentencing predicates)
- Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013) (standing and mootness principles: a party with a concrete interest prevents mootness)
- Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (post-commutation collateral challenge not moot when commuted term exceeds the potential sentence on successful collateral attack)
- Robson v. United States, 526 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1975) (pardon or commutation does not necessarily moot collateral challenges to conviction/sentence)
- United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190 (9th Cir. 1980) (commutation did not render habeas petition moot; district court could still vacate conviction/sentence)
- United States v. Surratt, 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015) (prior panel decision addressing availability of §2255 savings-clause relief; rehearing en banc granted)
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (constitutional change in capital sentencing used as comparative precedent in Schick)