United States v. Raul Vivas-Ceja
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 22438
| 7th Cir. | 2015Background
- Raul Vivas-Ceja, a Mexican national, pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326; district court sentenced him to 21 months.
- § 1326's maximum sentence increases to 20 years if the defendant has a prior conviction for an “aggravated felony,” a term that cross-references a “crime of violence” defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
- § 16(b) defines a crime of violence as a felony that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force … may be used” in committing the offense.
- The district court classified Vivas-Ceja’s Wisconsin felony conviction for fleeing an officer (Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3)) as a § 16(b) crime of violence, which elevated the statutory maximum.
- Vivas-Ceja argued § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States; the district court rejected the challenge and he appealed.
- The Seventh Circuit held the appeal after Johnson, applied Johnson’s reasoning to § 16(b), concluded § 16(b) is materially indistinguishable from the ACCA residual clause, and vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.
Issues
| Issue | Vivas-Ceja's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 16(b)’s definition of “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause | § 16(b) is vague like the ACCA residual clause; Johnson’s reasoning applies and renders § 16(b) void for vagueness | Johnson’s invalidation of the ACCA residual clause doesn’t control because § 16(b) differs (no enumerated list) and § 16(b) has not produced chaotic caselaw | § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague under Johnson’s reasoning; Vivas-Ceja’s sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidating the ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (interpreting § 16(b) to require assessing the elements and nature of the offense, not the particular facts)
- Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015) (concluding § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague in the civil-removal context)
- Jimenez-Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting similarity between § 16(b) and the ACCA residual clause)