906 F.3d 720
8th Cir.2018Background
- On Oct. 26, 2013 Long parked a rental car in a stranger’s backyard, knocked on the home, left on foot; homeowner called police reporting trespass/abandoned vehicle.
- Officers located the locked rental car, could not reach the rental company, and summoned a tow truck; Long returned, was handcuffed, frisked, and gave second‑hand permission to search but said the keys were elsewhere.
- A tow driver opened the car with a slim jim; officers began an inventory search and found a backpack with a Coke can that contained suspected white powder; an investigating sergeant then halted the inventory search to obtain a warrant.
- Warrant search later revealed a camcorder showing Long with a Glock and testing confirmed the powder as a controlled substance; Long was indicted for possession with intent to distribute and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- Long moved to suppress the vehicle evidence (challenging the inventory search) and later objected to a criminal‑history point based on a prior Missouri armed criminal action conviction; district court denied suppression and assessed the point, imposed a 360‑month sentence (upward variance).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to challenge rental‑car search | Long: he had a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the car | Government: Long lacked standing because he was not the named renter and had only second‑hand permission | Court assumed standing for purposes of decision but previously had held Long lacked standing; after Byrd the court vacated prior opinion and proceeds assuming standing |
| Validity of inventory search | Long: the inventory search was pretextual/unconstitutional and deviated from policy | Government: towing and inventory were reasonable under totality; officers acted before Long returned; any deviations were minor and search was stopped once probable cause appeared | Search was reasonable as an inventory search; suppression denied |
| Criminal‑history point for armed criminal action | Long: Missouri armed criminal action is not a "crime of violence" because it can encompass nonviolative property felonies | Government: statute poses serious potential risk of physical injury and fits the Guidelines’ residual clause | Court held Missouri armed criminal action is a crime of violence under the (then‑existing) residual clause; one criminal‑history point affirmed |
| Substantive reasonableness of 360‑month sentence | Long: the 21‑year upward variance was excessive and improperly weighted history | Government: district court adequately considered §3553(a) factors and justified variance to protect public | Sentence was not substantively unreasonable; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1998) (Eighth Circuit precedent on rental‑car privacy expectations)
- United States v. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018) (Supreme Court rejecting a per se rule denying privacy to rental drivers given consent from listed renter)
- United States v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392 (8th Cir. 2015) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
- United States v. Garner, 181 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1999) (investigative motive does not invalidate an otherwise valid inventory search)
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (holding the Guidelines’ residual clause not unconstitutionally vague)
- United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2011) (similar statute held to qualify under the residual clause)
- United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard for reviewing substantive reasonableness of sentences)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach to determining whether a statute is a crime of violence)