United States v. Rashawn Long, 870 F.3d 792

Background

On Oct. 26, 2013 Long parked a rental car in a neighbor’s yard; the neighbor called police and officers summoned a tow.
Long approached officers, gave identifying information, was handcuffed and frisked; officers learned warrants existed but were non‑extraditable and kept him cuffed in a patrol car.
Officers (with a firearms‑squad sergeant present) opened the locked rental with a slim jim and began an inventory search; they found a backpack and a suspicious sealed coke can containing a white powder.
Field testing was inconclusive; officers stopped the inventory search to obtain a warrant; subsequent warrant search found a camcorder showing Long with a Glock and lab testing identified the powder as buphedrone.
Long was indicted for possession with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841) and possession of a firearm by a felon (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); he moved to suppress the vehicle evidence and later objected to Guidelines criminal‑history scoring.
The district court denied suppression, treated Missouri armed criminal action as a "crime of violence" for Guidelines scoring, imposed an upward variance, and sentenced Long to 360 months; this appeal follows.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge search of rental car	Long: he had permission to drive (consensual possession) because renter (Phillips) testified Roger allowed Long to drive	Govt: Long lacked standing because he was not the authorized lessee and only had indirect permission through Roger	Court: No standing — indirect/attenuated permission (unauthorized‑driver‑once‑removed) does not create reasonable expectation of privacy
Validity of inventory search	Long: inventory search was unconstitutional and evidence should be suppressed	Govt: search was a proper inventory; alternatively Long lacks standing	Court: Denial of suppression affirmed (no standing); inventory search rationale accepted as basis for decision
Whether Missouri armed criminal action is a "crime of violence" for U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e)	Long: statute can cover non‑violent felonies (e.g., property crimes) and thus is not categorically a crime of violence	Govt: statute qualifies under Guidelines’ residual clause as presenting serious potential risk of physical injury	Court: Armed criminal action qualifies as a crime of violence under the then‑operative residual clause; additional criminal‑history point affirmed
Substantive reasonableness of 360‑month sentence	Long: 21‑year upward variance was excessive and relied improperly on his history	Govt: district court sufficiently considered § 3553(a) factors and explained variance	Court: Sentence was reasonable; district court did not abuse discretion and adequately justified the variance

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Cotton, 782 F.3d 392 (8th Cir.) (standard of review for suppression rulings)
United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353 (8th Cir. 1995) (standing requires legitimate expectation of privacy; rental‑car authorized‑driver rule)
United States v. Best, 135 F.3d 1223 (8th Cir. 1998) (driver of rental car lacks standing absent authorization or renter’s permission)
United States v. Watson, 650 F.3d 1084 (8th Cir. 2011) (statute like Missouri’s qualifies under Guidelines’ residual clause)
United States v. Boyce, 633 F.3d 708 (8th Cir. 2011) (residual‑clause analysis: serious potential risk and similarity to enumerated offenses)
United States v. Guiheen, 594 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2010) (possession of weapon during felony presents serious potential risk of injury)
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach to determining whether a statute is a crime of violence)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (on the validity of the Guidelines’ residual clause)
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard and explanation required for variance/sentencing review)
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (district court must justify deviations from Guidelines)